Fast Detection and Mitigation of Cascading Outages in the Power System by Pang, Chengzong
  
 
 
FAST DETECTION AND MITIGATION OF CASCADING OUTAGES IN THE 
POWER SYSTEM  
 
 
A Dissertation 
by 
CHENGZONG PANG 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
December 2011 
 
 
Major Subject: Electrical Engineering
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fast Detection and Mitigation of Cascading Outages in the Power System 
Copyright 2011 Chengzong Pang
  
 
FAST DETECTION AND MITIGATION OF CASCADING OUTAGES IN THE 
POWER SYSTEM  
 
A Dissertation 
by 
CHENGZONG PANG 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
Approved by: 
Chair of Committee,   Mladen Kezunovic 
Committee Members,  Chanan Singh 
Shankar P. Bhattacharyya 
William McCain Lively 
Head of Department,   Costas Georghiades 
 
December 2011 
 
Major Subject: Electrical Engineering
iii 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Fast Detection and Mitigation of Cascading Outages in the Power System. (December 
2011) 
Chengzong Pang, B.S., North China Electric Power University, China 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Mladen Kezunovic 
 
This dissertation studies the causes and mechanism of power system cascading 
outages and proposes the improved interactive scheme between system-wide and local 
levels of monitoring and control to quickly detect, classify and mitigate the cascading 
outages in power system. 
A novel method for evaluating the vulnerability of individual components as 
well as the whole power system, which is named as weighted vulnerability analysis, is 
developed. Betweenness centrality is used to measure the importance of each bus and 
transmission line in the modeled power system network, which is in turn used to 
determine the weights for the weighted vulnerability index. It features fast reaction 
time and achieves higher accuracy when dealing with the cascading outage detection, 
classification and mitigation over the traditional methods.  
The overload problem due to power flow redistribution after one line tripped is 
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a critical factor contributing to the cascading outages. A parallel corridor searching 
method is proposed to quickly identify the most vulnerable components after tripping a 
transmission line. The power system topology model can be simplified into state graph 
after searching the domains for each generator, the commons for each bus, and links 
between the commons. The parallel corridor will be determined by searching the links 
and commons in system topology graph for the given state of power system operation.  
During stressed operating state, either stable or unstable power swing may have 
impacts on distance relay judgment and lead to relay misoperation, which will result in 
the power system lines being tripped and as a consequence power system operating 
state becoming even more stressful. At the local level, an enhanced fault detection tool 
during power system swing is developed to reduce the chance of relay misoperation.  
Comprehensive simulation studies have been implemented by using the IEEE 
39-bus and 118-bus test systems. The results are promising because: 
• The results from weighted vulnerability analysis could provide better 
system situational awareness and accurate information about the 
disturbance; 
• The results form parallel corridor search method could identify the most 
vulnerable lines after power re-distribution, which will give operator time 
to take remedial actions; 
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• The results from new travelling wave and wavelet transform based fault 
detection could reduce the impact of relay misoperation.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Problem Formulation 
Electric1
[1]
 power system is one of the most complex man-made systems. With 
the development of flexible electricity markets operation under the deregulation rules, 
power system became more stressed and power network security and reliability criteria 
more complex. Power systems are exposed to many kinds of disturbances, which may 
come from animal contacts, human errors, equipment malfunction, natural disasters, 
intentional sabotage, etc., and some of these disturbances may cause major power 
service interruption . Protective relays and other control actions may be invoked to 
steer the system away from severe consequences, and to limit the extent of the 
disturbance. This way, most disturbances can be mitigated without power service 
interruption. But in some specific circumstances the disturbances may not be mitigated 
and will cause major service interruption. 
Here, we are interested in one of the most severe kind of system disturbances: 
Cascading Failures. Cascading failure is defined as “a sequence of dependent failures 
of individual components that successively weaken the power system.” [2] Cascading 
outage, especially the large-scale cascading outage, draws special attention since it can 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery. 
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cause great economic loss to utility companies and other businesses and have 
devastating impact on people’s life. For example, the Northwestern America Blackout 
in 1996 disconnected 30.39 GW of power to 7.5 million customers [3]; Northeastern 
System Blackout in 2003 led to the load loss of 61.8GW, which influenced more than 
50 million people and spread through Northern Ohio, much of Michigan, Ontario, parts 
of Pennsylvania and Connecticut, and New York [1]. 
Considering the large number of individual components it involves, the wide 
range of time scales of the event dynamics, and the different mechanisms of how the 
components interact, the modeling and analysis of cascading outages is extremely 
complicated. Many researchers have put lots of efforts on analyzing and finding 
solutions to detect, classify, mitigate or prevent cascading outages. But till now, how to 
find the solution of fast detection and mitigation of the cascading outages still remains 
the industry challenge. 
1.1.1 Frequency of Large Blackouts 
A common perspective today is that large area blackouts are rarer than small 
size blackouts. It is true for sure. But, how much rarer are large area blackouts than the 
small ones? We might expect the probability distribution of blackout size, which 
includes power shed, energy unserved, customer disconnected, duration, and number 
of lines tripped [2], to fall off exponentially as the size of the blackout increases. After 
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squaring so many times when increasing the blackout size, the probability of the larger 
blackouts should vanished. However, Carreras et al [4] found that the probability 
distribution of the blackout sizes in North American does not decrease exponentially 
with the size of the blackouts, but rather has an approximate power law region with an 
exponent between -1 and -2. The impact of this power law is also proved in Literature 
[5] by the frequencies of blackouts in various size categories and their overall 
contributions to blackout risk in North America, In terms of the total amount of 
demand interrupted, the costs of cascading failures have enormous variance [5], which 
is shown in Figure 2. The same power law properties resulted from studies of the 
power system of China [6], Sweden [7], Norway [8], etc. Figure 1 shows the example 
on a log-log scale of the empirical probability distribution of the North American 
blackout size obtained from North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) 
Disturbance Analysis Working Group data [9].  
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Figure 1  North American Blackout Size Probability Distribution from NERC 
Distribution Analysis Working Group Data 
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Figure 2  The Relative Blackout Frequency to Blackout Risk from Large North 
America Blackouts in Various Size Categories 
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The power law property suggests that large scale blackouts are much more 
likely than they are expected. This phenomenon can be explained by the dependency of 
failures in the blackout, or cascading failures. With the more failures occurring in the 
power system, the more stressed the power system becomes. The weakened power 
system makes the failures occur more likely, which will lead to the large scale 
blackout.  
In summary, cascading outages cannot be eliminated completely and they 
occurrence is much more likely than the common exponential tails. To illustrate the 
severity of possible impacts, Table 1 shows the summary of some major consequences 
of the cascading outages throughout the world in the past several decades. [1], 
[10]-[13]  
1.1.2 Challenges of Cascading Analysis 
In the United States, the monitoring of cascading outages has been addressed 
by NERC as voluntary effort in the beginning. But now the monitoring and reporting 
has been changed to the mandatory effort by addressing it in the standards, which 
include TOP-004-2, TPL-001-0, TPL-002-0a, TPL-003-0a, TPL-004-0, etc. [14]. Since 
the large-area blackouts cannot be eliminated, and their occurrences always come with 
catastrophic social and economical impacts, it is very urgent and important to find a 
solution for fast detection and mitigation of cascading outages in power system.  
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Table 1  Summary of Cascading Outages and Related Consequences 
 Location Data Lost of MW 
Affected 
People 
Collapse 
Time 
Restoration 
Time 
1 US-Northeastern 
Nov. 9, 
1965 
20000 30 million 13mins 13 hrs 
2 New York 
July 13, 
1977 
6000 9 million 1 hr 26 hrs 
3 France 
Dec. 19, 
1978 
29000  26mins 5 hrs 
4 Sweden 
Dec. 27, 
1983 
> 7000 
4,5 
million 
53 secs About 5 hrs 
5 Tokyo (Japan) 
July 23, 
1987 
8200 
2.8 
million 
20 mins 
About 75 
mins 
6 US-Western 
July 2, 
1996 
11850 2 million 36 secs 
a few mins to 
several hrs 
7 US-Western 
Aug. 10, 
1996 
30500 
7.5 
million 
>6 mins 
A few mins 
to 9 hrs 
8 Brazil 
Mar. 11, 
1999 
25000 75 million 30 secs 
30 mins to 4 
hrs 
9 US- Northeastern 
Aug. 14, 
2003 
61800 50 million > 1hr Up to 4 days 
10 Denmark/Sweden 
Sept. 23, 
2003 
6550 
4.85 
million 
7 mins 
Average 2 to 
4.3 hrs 
11 Italy 
Sept. 28, 
2003 
27700 57 million 27 mins 
2.5 to 19.5 
hrs 
12 Moscow/Russia 
May 24, 
2005 
2500 4 million > 6hr  
13 US-EI 
Aug. 4, 
2007 
4261  6 mins  
14 Brazil 
Nov. 10, 
2009 
18000 60 million  >3 hr 
15 US-San Diego Sept. 8, 
2011 6982 
2.7 
million 11 mins 1.5 to 12 hrs 
16 South Korea Sept. 15, 
2011 240 2.1 million 2 hr > 3hr 
17 Chile Sept. 25, 
2011  9 million  > 2hr 
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After an extensive study of the major blackouts in the history, it appears that 
relaying problems and inadequate understanding of unfolding events are two major 
contributing factors to inability of predicting or preventing cascading events. This is 
discussed in the reports for the August 1996 US West Coast System Blackout [3] and 
August 2003 US Northeast System Blackout [1]. Protective relays can quickly identify 
and isolate faulted area in a power system to maintain the power system security and 
reliability. However, when the relays trip one faulted transmission line in the stressed 
power system, the power flow on this line will be transferred to the other transmission 
lines. Those lines may be overloaded and new faults may develop and then cascading 
trips may be induced by the backup relays even if there are no new faults. The existing 
traditional protection only utilizes the local data and the ultimate goals are to eliminate 
the fault as soon as possible. The impact of power flow transferring within the system 
cannot be considered ahead of the time. Thus the capability of relays to deal with any 
unforeseen or unfolding events is drastically reduced. Hence new tools for power 
system operators to enhance power system security and reliability under such 
circumstances are needed. The tools to evaluate the impact after any disturbance 
happened in the system and to provide the suggested emergency control actions when 
relaying operates unexpectedly are not available.  
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1.2 Current Research Efforts 
Many methods have been proposed so far aiming at understanding and finding 
ways for detecting, preventing, and mitigating the cascading events. IEEE Computer 
Analytical Methods Subcommittee (CAMS) had a Task Force on Understanding, 
Predication, Mitigation and Restoration of Cascading Failures, which describes the 
state of art of cascading risk assessment tools by means of an updated view prepared 
by experts representing utilities, universities, research institutes and consulting 
companies [2], [5], [15]. An overview of existing major methods of cascading outages 
analysis is summarized as following: 
1.2.1 Cascading Outage Modeling and Simulation 
Considering that the cascading phenomena are very complicated because of the 
diversity of failures and interactions, it is not possible to accomplish an exhaustive 
computation of all possible combinations of failures in power system. Thus a very 
detailed model of all the failures and their interactions is infeasible. Different 
researchers have made some compromises in modeling and simulating the cascading 
outages. Based on the Self-organized Criticality (SOC) theory, three different models 
have been proposed: Oak Ridge-Pserc-Alaska (OPA) model, CASCADE model, and 
Branch Process model. OPA model [16]-[18] tries to explain the propagating of 
cascading outages in long-term view of slow and fast dynamics behavior. CASCADE 
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model [20] is an analytically tractable probabilistic model of cascading outages that 
captures the weakening of the system as the cascade proceeds. It tries to explain the 
probability relations between the blackout size and the initial disturbance of power 
system. The Branching Process model [21]-[23] is an approximation of CASCADE 
models that quantifies the propagation of cascading failures with parameter and 
simplifies the mathematical modeling for the purpose of estimating the distribution of 
the final blackout size. The three models neglect many of the cascading processes in 
blackouts and the timing of the events. A protection system reliability model, which 
proposes an integrated scheme to study power system vulnerability considering 
protection system failures leading to the cascading outages has been introduced in 
[24][25]. This scheme can assess the system vulnerability based on Bus Isolation 
Probability (BIP), Loss of Load Probability (LOLP), Expected Power Loss (EPL), 
Probability of Stability (POS), and Integrated System Vulnerability (ISV). By using 
Monte Carlo simulation approach, this scheme simulates system behavior of cascading 
outages. Other models, such as the Manchester model [26], hidden failures model of 
the protection system [27], stochastic model [28], etc. have also been proposed. 
1.2.2 Network Theory Approaches 
Motivated by the propagation of failures and congestion in the Internet, some 
researchers have studied the statistical properties of the power system network by 
10 
 
 
neglecting power flows. Watts has proved that the topology of a typical power system 
network is a small-world network [29]. Hines and Blumsack [30] suggest that the 
power systems have a scale free structure by accounting for the electrical distances. 
Lesieutre , et al. [31] refined the concept of topological graph concepts in order to be 
more consistent with power system generation and load patterns. Motter, et al. 
[32]Error! Reference source not found. try to formulate the problem of cascading 
attack and work on cascading phase transitions by complex networks theory. 
1.2.3 Other Approaches  
Dynamic event tree analysis [33] combines the probability and event tree 
technique for prediction and mitigation of cascading events. It is still very difficult to 
generate comprehensive event trees due to the complexity and large number of 
components of the power system. For the wide area back up protection expert system 
[34], it may be easy to apply it in the radial system, but it is not easy to do the same in 
a large and mashed transmission network. Pattern recognition method has been 
discussed in [35] by identifying and capturing the typical basic patterns of cascading 
events, and then combining them into cascading sequences. However, it is very 
complicated to understand the typical pattern for the large power system. Self-healing 
system [36] could determine the actions it should take and offers the capability of 
adaptive reconfiguration, such as load shedding. 
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1.3 Proposed Research 
In summary, detecting and preventing cascading outages is crucial to 
maintaining the power system reliability and security. Many methods have been 
proposed for risk assessment of cascading outages, which could be used to benefit for 
power system planning. But study of methods to detect and mitigate the cascading 
outages still requires much research efforts. Developing a generalized tool for power 
system operator’s decision support for corrective control after the initialing 
contingency occurs is still desirable.  
Texas A&M University researchers have developed a series of new methods 
and new tools to help detect, prevent and mitigate the outages, which include steady 
state control scheme, transient stability control scheme, and interactive system-wide 
and local scheme [37]. Based on those developed methods and tools, this dissertation 
improves the interactive scheme solution for the fast detection and mitigation of 
cascading outages in power system.  
At system-wide level, weighted vulnerability analysis method and parallel 
corridor searching method are proposed. The weighted vulnerability analysis method is 
developed to evaluate vulnerability of the whole power system as well as individual 
elements, not only from the view of electrical properties but also from the view of 
topology network. The parallel corridor searching method is presented to quickly 
12 
 
 
identify the most vulnerable components after tripping any transmission line to solve 
the overloading problem due to power flow redistribution. The proposed method is 
based on topological partitioning used in graph theory. The vulnerability evaluation 
and vulnerable components identification tool could make the system operator better 
understand the unfolding events and take remedial actions under extreme conditions.  
At local level, an enhanced fault detection method during power swing is 
proposed to reduce the risk of relay misoperation. Since power swing, either stable or 
unstable, may have impacts on distance relay judgment and lead to relay misoperation, 
which will result in the system becoming more stressful. It may cause catastrophic 
outcomes especially when the power system is an emergency state. The enhanced fault 
detection method will increase system security when installing it on those vulnerable 
elements located by using the weighted vulnerability analysis and parallel corridor 
searching method. 
Figure 3 shows the framework of the proposed method, which covers three 
stages. The key algorithms of the proposed solution will be discussed in details in the 
following sections. 
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Figure 3  Flowchart of Proposed Method for Fast Detection and Mitigation of 
Cascading Outages 
 
14 
 
 
1.3.1 Pre-disturbance Stage 
In this stage, the power system is in normal condition. After getting the base 
power flow results from state estimation, two main analysis tasks need to be 
accomplished. 
Weighted Vulnerability Analysis: Song has proposed the concepts of 
Vulnerability Index (VI) and Margin Index (MI) [37] for the main elements in power 
system: generators, buses, and branches. The system-wide vulnerability and security of 
individual elements can be evaluated by the different VI and MI values computed for 
various system conditions. But those VIs and MIs only considered the electrical 
properties of power system. When performing the steady state analysis to find the 
vulnerability of system elements, the weights for all VIs and MIs are assigned with 
value of one as default value or based on historical experience of system operator. The 
weight values present the importance of each VI and MI in system-wide or individual 
vulnerability. How to determine the weight values still remains a challenge. In this 
dissertation, a method to calculate the weight values for each VI and MI which is based 
on the concepts of vertex and edge betweenness centralities is proposed. With those 
calculated weights, the new weighted vulnerability analysis can be implemented based 
on Weighted Vulnerability Index (WVI). The improved WVI values provide a 
combined consideration of both electrical characteristics of power system and topology 
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parameters in the graph representation of the electrical network. This way, the 
vulnerable system elements could be identified and the whole system conditions could 
be evaluated. Section 4 will discuss the detailed procedures. 
Topological Pre-processing: The power system can be modeled as a graph 
network and analyzed to solve practical problems. When modeling power system, the 
generators, bus bars and loads can be identified as the graph nodes and the connecting 
transmission lines can be modeled as the edges. It any steady state, a power system 
would be a directed graph network because of the directions of power flow.  
After the topological model is created, the domain of each generator, the 
common of buses and links between commons will be determined, which is called 
topological pre-processing. The concepts of generator domain and bus common were 
proposed by Kirschen, et al. to determine which generators are supplying a particular 
load, how much use each generator is making of a transmission line, and what is each 
generator’s contribution to the system losses [38]. The domain of a generator is defined 
as the set of buses which are reached by power produced by this generator. A common 
is defined as a set of contiguous buses supplied by the same generators. Unconnected 
sets of buses supplied by the same generators are treated as separate commons. A bus 
belongs to one and only on common. Figure 4 shows an example of commons for 
6-bus system. It has three commons under the given power flow result: Common 1 
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includes Bus 1 and 2, which are supplied by generator A only; Common 2 includes Bus 
3, 4, and 5, which are supplied by both generator A and B; Common 3 only includes 
Bus 6, which is supplied by generator A, B, and C. These concepts are used here for 
fast searching vulnerable parts due to power flow redistribution in power system 
during cascading outages. Typical four steps will be taken: creating power system 
topological model, searching the domain for each generator and common for each bus, 
building state graph by partitioning the original topological model into different zones 
with homogenous characteristics, and identifying the links in the state graph. The 
detailed procedures will be discussed in Section 5. 
 
 
Figure 4  Commons for the 6-bus System 
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1.3.2 Post-disturbance Stage 
If some disturbance happens, such as transmission line tripping due to faults, 
the topology of the power system network will change. The updated topological 
processing will be performed based on the available pre-processing results, which 
could be accomplished very fast. The power system may still be in stable but more 
stressed condition. The power flow on the tripped transmission line will be transferred 
to the other lines and may cause overload problem and the occurrence of power swing, 
which may cause relay misoperation. The most vulnerable elements suffering from the 
disturbance greatly could be identified by searching the links related with faulted lines 
in the generated state graph, which may take most of the power flow from the tripped 
line. An effective method to detect the fault during power swing is proposed to increase 
relay dependability. The detailed description will be provided in Section 6. 
1.3.3 Post-disturbance Control  
After the key vulnerable elements have been identified, the associated remedial 
control actions need to be taken to solve the overload and/or low voltage problems. For 
the given power system, there are many available network control methods, such as 
line switching, Thyristor Controlled Series Capacitors (TCSC) control, Static Var 
Compensation (SVC) control, shunt capacitor or reactor switching, etc [39]-[43]. A 
control scheme, which will be used as the primary control selection method for this 
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stage has been proved effective in solving the line overload, congestion, bus high or 
low voltage problems [44],. The control scheme is based on methods of network 
contribution factor (NCF), generator distribution factor (GDF), load distribution factor 
(LDF), and selected minimum load shedding (SMLS). The optimal control actions will 
be taken to enhance system security level. The detailed description about these control 
methods can be found in [37] and [44].   
1.4 Organization of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is organized as follows. The background of cascading outages 
in power system is provided in Section 2. Section 3 describes the power system 
applications of graph theory and the topological model. The proposed weighted 
vulnerability analysis method is presented in Section 4. Section 5 describes the parallel 
corridor searching method based on graph partitioning. Section 6 introduced the 
enhanced distance relay scheme for vulnerable parts in power system. The conclusions 
and contribution of the dissertation are discussed in Section 7. References and 
Appendices are attached in the end. 
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2. BACKGROUND OF CASCADING OUTAGES IN POWER SYSTEM 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Power systems are exposed to all kinds of disturbances. Among the 
disturbances, cascading outage, especially the large-scale cascading outage, may cause 
great economic damage to the power system and devastating impact on people’s life. In 
this section, the background of cascading outages in power system will be discussed. 
Section 2.2 explains the problem of cascading outages. Section 2.3 reviews the major 
blackouts in the world. The key lessons learned from those major blackouts are 
presented in section 2.4. Section 2.5 gives the summary. 
2.2 Problem of Cascading Outages 
Power system security and stability are the top priority when operating the 
electric power system. Power systems are exposed to all kinds of disturbances, which 
may come from bad weather, human errors, equipment malfunction, natural disasters, 
etc., and some of these disturbances may cause power service interruption. This 
situation is getting even worse under new market rules introduced by deregulation 
causing more stressed operation.  
As one of those disturbances, cascading failure is defined as “a sequence of 
dependent failures of individual components that successively weaken the power 
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system.” [2]. Cascading outage, especially the large-scale cascading outage, draws 
special attention since it can cause great economic loss in revenue for the power 
system owners and devastating impact on people’s life, such as North America 
northeastern system blackout in 2003 [1], Europe blackout in 2006 [45], and Brazil 
blackout in 2009 [46], etc.  
2.3 Major Blackouts in the World 
2.3.1 North American Northeast Blackout in 2003 
The 2003 Northeast Blackout was summarized in the final report by North 
American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) [1]. 
This blackout happened on August 14, 2003, which was a typical hot summer 
day. System loads in the eastern Great Lakes had exceeded the day-ahead forecasts but 
still were below the historical record level. FirstEnergy was importing power into the 
Cleveland area to meet the demand. With the increase of load and some local unit 
outages, voltage in this area began sagging. Midwest Independent System Operator 
(MISO) encountered software problem with their system analysis and monitoring tools 
beginning from 12:15. Figure 5 summarizes the timeline of major events in the origin 
of the blackout in Ohio for different phases [1]. 
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Figure 5  Timeline of 2003 Northeastern Blackout in Ohio 
 
The Eastlake 5 unit near Cleveland tripped at 13:31 due to short of enough 
reactive output to support the voltage. This trip removed about 500 MW active power 
and similar amount of reactive power generation from the area, further increasing the 
imports to serve the load and the voltage situation. It cannot be concluded that this trip 
is the event that caused the blackout, since the power system is planned to withstand 
such contingencies. Any probable single event leading to a loss of power system 
elements should not endanger the security of interconnected operation. The remaining 
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network elements should be able to accommodate the additional load or change of 
generation, voltage deviation or transient stability regime caused by the initial failure. 
But unfortunately the alarm and event logging software in the FirstEnergy Energy 
Management System (EMS) failed after 14:14. The system operators were unaware of 
those failures. One 345 kV transmission line, Chamberlin-Harding, which connects the 
Cleveland area to generation in the Ohio River Valley to the southeast tripped at 15:05,. 
This line tripped due to a ground fault caused by conductors sagging into a 42 foot tall 
tree growing in the line’s right of way. The second 345 kV line, Hanna-Juniper, tripped 
after about half an hour later. Loss of these two lines caring power into Cleveland 
caused flows from the south to squeeze onto other more indirect paths. At 15:41, the 
third 345 kV line to the southeast of Cleveland, Star-South Canton, also tripped and 
locked out. At this point, only one 345 kV line, Sammis-Star and several 138 kV lines 
remained in service to maintain the connection of the Cleveland area to the Ohio Valley. 
From 15:39 to 15:59, the 138-kV system began to collapse due to overloads and lines 
tripping.  
At 16:05, the last 345 kV line, Sammis-Star, tripped, which is considered as the 
cascade trigger. The trip of Sammis-Star initiated a rapid cascade that would have been 
virtually impossible to stop by human intervention. Two more 345 kV lines in 
northwest Ohio, Muskingum-Ohio Central-Galion and East Lima-Fostoria Central, 
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tripped around 16:09, which completed the separation of northern Ohio from central 
Ohio and forced the loop power flow further north into Michigan. Figure 6 shows the 
rate of line and generator trips during the cascading outage [1]. The events in the 
cascade started relatively slowly during the initial stage of the blackout, but picked up 
the speed after 16:08:59 EDT. From 16:09 to 16:10, large number of generators were 
lost and system collapsed. 
 
 
Figure 6  Rate of Line and Generator Trips during Cascading Outage 
 
The post-mortem investigation had identified the typical causes of this blackout 
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were the lack of understanding of the transmission system and inadequate real-time 
diagnostic support from the reliability coordinators. The northeastern system was in 
extreme condition due to lack of reactive power. Although the tripping of the first few 
transmission lines was due to inadequate tree trimming, overload is the major 
contributor to the subsequent cascading trips of transmission lines. If system operator 
have had better situational awareness and took remedial actions through load shedding, 
it might have prevented the cascading outage.     
2.3.2 Europe Blackout in 2006 
The 2006 Europe major disturbance of November 4, 2006 was summarized in 
the final report by Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE) 
[45].  
November 4th was a weekend. As usual, when demand is lower than during the 
working days, several transmission network elements were not in operation due to 
scheduled maintenance and construction work. In the meantime, the specific topology 
in the 380 kV substation of Borken in E.ON Netz, a local control center, changed due 
to construction work. Two busbars in the substation were split in two parts each, which 
made the power flow from East to West in this region impossible. Additionally, as the 
normal configuration, the 380 kV Landesbergen substation in E.ON Netz was operated 
with two separated busbars in order to reduce the short-circuit current which would 
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exceed the limit of the switchgear in case Robert Frank 4 power plant is in operation.  
An exchange program represents the total scheduled energy interchange 
between two control areas or between control blocks. Figure 7 shows both exchange 
programs resulted from trading activities (red) and physical flows (blue) as recorded on 
November 4 at 22:09 [45]. It shows the physical flows significantly differ from the 
exchange programs, which is pretty normal in a highly meshed network. There is high 
flow from Germany to The Netherlands and to Poland due to the high wind generation 
in Germany.  
There was also a planning for the Conneforde-Diele outage, which is a 380 KV 
transmission line with double circuits. Before the opening, RWE Transmission System 
Operators (TSO) has made the power flow calculation and an N-1 analysis with the 
outage of the Conneforde-Diele line. The results confirmed the grid would be highly 
loaded but still secure.  
At 21:38, E.ON Netz switched off first circuit of the 380 kV line 
Conneforde-Diele. And one minute later, the second circuit was switched off. After the 
switching operation, E.ON Netz received several warning messages about the high 
power flow on the lines Elsen-Twistetal and Elsen-Bechterdissen. At 21:41, RWE TSO 
informed E.ON Netz about the safety limit value of 1795 A on the line 
Landesbergen-Wehrendorf (an interconnection line between E.ON Netz and RWE 
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TSO). At this point of time the current on this line has not reached its given limit (1795 
A), and the internal RWE TSO network still met the N-1 criterion. The protection 
setting on both sides of Landesbergen-Wehrendorf line were different: 3000 A on the 
E.ON side and 2100 A on the RWE side. The dispatchers were not aware of the settings 
in the protection system, which make the dispatchers not take into account the correct 
values of their evolution of the situation later. The load on the 
Landesbergen-Wehrendorf line increased by 100 MW between 22:05 and 22:07, and 
exceeded the warning value of 1795 A for RWE TSO. E.ON Netz made an empirical 
assessment of corrective switching measures without any load flow calculations for 
checking N-1 criterion after receiving the urgent intervention to restore safe grid 
operation from RWE TSO at 22:08. In the end, the line was tripped by the distance 
relays in the Wehrendorf side due to overloading. This tripping led to cascading line 
tripping throughout the UCTE area. Eventually, the UCTE system was split at 22:10 
into three subsystems as shown in Figure 8 [45]. The area 1 and 3 remained 
asynchronously connected through the DC link between Italy and Greece during the 
whole event. Figure 9 shows the frequency recordings retrieved by Wide Area 
Measurement Systems (WAMS) before, during and after the split-up in the three areas. 
The manual switching in the Landesbergen substation is considered as the trigger event 
for the frequency oscillations leading to different lines tripping. 
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Figure 7  Exchange Programs and Physical Flows on Nov. 4 at 22:09  
 
Figure 8  Schematic Map of UCTE Area Split into Three Areas  
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Figure 9  Frequency Recordings during the Blackout  
 
The 2006 UCTE blackout led to power supply disruptions for more than 15 
million European households. The immediate action taken by all TSOs according to 
the UCTE security standards prevented this disturbance to turn into a Europe-wide 
blackout. However, this event ranks among the most severe and largest disturbances in 
Europe. It took 38 minutes after the splitting to complete the full resynchronization of 
the UCTE system and almost 2 hours to e-establish a normal situation in all European 
countries.  
The main cause of this blackout was non-compliance with the N-1 criterion. 
Transmission line overloading occurred right after the scheduled Conneforde-Diele 
380 KV transmission line outage, which triggered the cascading trips. Similar to 2003 
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Northeastern Blackout, insufficient coordination and communication among the 
TSOs/ISOs was also an important contributing factor.  
2.4 Lessons Learned from Cascading Outages 
2.4.1 Causes of Cascading Outage 
The cascading outage is a sequence of events in which an initial disturbance 
triggers a sequence of one or more dependent component outages. As mentioned above, 
many factors can contribute to the cascading outages. IEEE Computer Analytical 
Methods Subcommittee (CAMS) has formed a Task Force on Understanding, 
Prediction, Mitigation and Restorations of Cascading Failures to promote development 
of new methods, technologies and tools. The Task Force has summarized the 
immediate causes of cascading trips during blackouts, which include: [5] 
• Overloaded transmission lines that subsequently contact vegetation 
• Overcurrent/undervoltage conditions triggering distance relay actions 
• Hidden failures in protection devices, which are exposed by a change in 
operating state 
• Voltage collapse 
• Insufficient reactive power resources 
• Stalled motors triggered by low voltages or off-nominal frequency 
• Generator rotor dynamic instability 
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• Small signal instability 
• Over (or under) excitation in generators 
• Over (or under) speed in generators 
• Operator or maintenance personnel error 
• Computer or software errors and failures 
• Errors in operational procedures 
Each large blackout typically combines several of these interactions into 
dependent failures. One common aspect of these interactions is that the interactions 
tend to be stronger when the power system is more stressed or loaded. Due to the 
complex factors causing cascading outage, to detect, prevent and mitigate cascading 
outages is still one of the most difficult and challenging tasks for power system 
researchers and engineers.  
2.4.2 Mechanism of Cascading Outages 
Cascading outages are always complex and many factors influence cascading 
outages. Chen has divided the blackouts into four typical stages of cascading 
sequences when the outages propagate [47]: 
• Initiating contingency; 
• Steady-state progression; 
• Transient progression; 
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• Uncontrolled islanding and blackout.  
In this dissertation, the four propagating stages can be simplified into two 
stages as temporal view:  
• Steady state progress stage 
• Transient progress stage.  
Steady state progression is the slow succession comparing to the fast 
succession of transient progression. The initiating contingency is part of the steady 
state progress. The transient progress stage is a fast transient process resulting in 
cascading blackouts and finally the collapse of the entire system. Uncontrolled 
islanding and blackout occur in this stage. 
During the steady-state progression stage, the system becomes stressed with 
heavy loading on system components, such as transmission lines, generators, and 
transformers. Successive events occur, and the time intervals between the trips of 
components are fairly long. For example, the sequence tripping for transmission line 
overload or generator over-excitation caused by one line tripping may follow after 
several minutes or even hours. These long time intervals may be long enough for the 
system operators to take corrective actions needed to mitigate the unfolding events or 
undesired trend. Developing a generalized tool or set of tools for power system 
operator’s decision support for corrective control after the initialing contingency 
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occurs is not only desirable but also feasible. 
2.5 Summary 
Although the risk of large area cascading outages occurring is low, the 
consequences of cascading outages may bring catastrophic social and economic 
impacts. By reviewing the major blackouts in the world, the background of cascading 
outages have been introduced. It is obvious that many factors can cause cascading 
outages. Most of cascading outages have two stages: steady-state progression and 
transient progression. Steady state progress stage is an important period, since the 
system operators may have enough time to evaluate the system condition, identify 
some vulnerable contingencies, take some control to increase the security level and 
prevent the possible cascading blackouts. 
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3. POWER SYSTEM TOPOLOGICAL MODEL 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Electric power system is one of the most complex man-made systems. With the 
advances in complex network theory, the power system can be modeled as a graph 
network and analyzed to solve practical problems. In this section, the power system 
topological model will be discussed. Section 3.2 reviews the applications of graph 
theory in power system. The method of modeling power system as directed graph 
network is presented in Section 3.3. Case study and summary are given in Section 3.4 
and 3.5 respectively. 
3.2 Power System Applications of Graph Theory 
Graph theory is an important branch of mathematics concerned about how 
networks can be encoded and how their properties may be measured [48]. It provides a 
feasible way to simplify the complex problems into a set of linked nodes. Because of 
its wide applicability, graph theory is one of the fast-growing areas of modern 
mathematics. Graph theory has been widely introduced into the research of many areas, 
such as mathematics, computer programming and networking, business administration, 
sociology, economics, communications, etc.[48]-[55].  
Electric power system is an integrated huge synchronous machine system 
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composed by thousands of generators, transformers, transmission lines, substations, 
and loads, with the interfaces to numerous measurement, communication, and control 
units. The power system can be modeled as a graph network and analyzed to solve 
practical problems.  
Lee, et al. proposed a transportation method for economic dispatch application 
based on graph theory [56]. Watts showed that the topology of a typical power system 
network is a small-world network [57]. Hines and Blumsack [58] derived a measure of 
electrical centrality for power system networks, which describes the structure of the 
network as a function of its electrical topology rather than its physical topology. 
Leisieutre, et al. [59] refined the topological graph concepts in order to be more 
consistent with power system generation and load patterns by offering an approximate 
solution through relaxation of the integer problem and suggesting refinement using 
stochastic methods. Motter and Lai [32] tried to formulate the problem of cascading 
attack and worked on cascading phase transitions by complex networks theory. They 
demonstrated that the heterogeneity of power system networks makes them particularly 
vulnerable to attacks in that a large-scale cascade may be triggered by disabling a 
single key event, which brings serious concerns on the security of such systems. 
Korres and Katsikas presented a hybrid topological-numerical approach for 
observability analysis in power system state estimation by partitioning the network in 
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observable areas based on graph theory [60]. Liu, et al. introduced the attack graph and 
multiple criteria decision-making (MCDM) to deal with the difficulties of security 
assessment: the security analysis of power control process and the security degree of 
each control step [61].  Dustegor, et al. presented model-based fault detection and 
location methodology based on structural analysis, which utilizes the analytical 
redundancy inherent in the system structure and provided a strategy for systematic and 
automatic generation of residuals [62]. In this dissertation, graph theory will be used to 
identify the vulnerable elements in the power system.  
3.3 Power System as Directed Graph Network 
3.3.1 Graph Model of Power System Elements 
Suppose ( )EVG ,=  is a graph network with v  nodes (vertices) and e  links 
(edges). V is the set of vertices, and E is the set of connecting edges, which is 
showing the relations between those vertices. The graph will be getting more complex 
with the increasing number of vertices and edges. Two important matrices are widely 
used to study graphs: adjacency matrix and incidence matrix.  
The adjacency matrix { }ijaA =  implies the connectivity of the vertices, which 
is defined by: 



=
otherwise
aij 0
   vand between v edgean  is  thereif1 ji            (1) 
The incidence matrix { }'' ijaA =  implies the connectivity of the vertex to edge, 
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which is defined by: 



=
otherwise
aij 0
  e edge  toconnected  vertex vif1 ji'             (2) 
For example, for a graph with five vertices and seven edges shown in Figure 10, 
the adjacency matrix A  and incidence matrix 'A  can be obtained based on Equation 
(1) and (2), respectively.    
















=
01110
10010
10011
11101
00110
A       
















=
1110000
0101000
1000110
0011101
0000011
'A
 
If the graph is undirected graph as shown in Figure 10, the adjacency matrix is 
symmetric.  
 
2 3
4 5
1
e1 e2
e3
e7e5
e6
e4
 
Figure 10 A Graph with Five Vertices and Seven Edges 
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Since the power system is an integrated synchronous system, in which the 
substations are connected to each other by transmission lines, it is very easy to get the 
topological model of power system represented as a graph. When modeling power 
system using graphs, the generators, bus bars and loads can be identified as the graph 
nodes and the connecting transmission lines can be modeled as the edges. Thus the 
undirected graph model of the power system is easily obtained. 
3.3.2 Directed Graph Model 
In power engineering, the power flow study is always an important tool 
involving numerical analysis applied to a power system. It has been studied that in any 
steady state, a power system would be a directed graph network [63], because the 
directions of power flow in the modeled network can be measured in any given steady 
state. Hence, the power system should be modeled as the directed graph. For the 
directed graph, the definitions of adjacency matrix and incidence matrix are different 
than those in undirected graph. 
The directed acyclic graph is defined as a directed graph with no directed 
cycles, which is formed by a collection of vertices and directed edges, each edge 
connecting one vertex to another, such that there is no way to start at some vertex v 
and follow a sequence of edges that eventually loops back to v again [63]. 
For a directed graph G, the adjacency matrix { }ijaA =  implies the connectivity 
38 
 
 
of the vertices, which is defined by: 



=
otherwise
aij 0
   v to vfrom edge directed a is  thereif1 ji           (3) 
For a directed graph G, the incidence matrix { }'' ijaA =  implies the connectivity 
of the vertex to edge, which is defined by: 





−=
jii
ji
ji
'
e edgeby  connectednot  is  vertex vand  vertex vif0
e edge of end receiving is  vertex vif1
e edge of end sending is  vertex vif1
ija       (4) 
3.4 Case Study 
Figure 11 shows a simple example of 4-bus system connected by five 
transmission lines. The directed graph model of this 4-bus system is also shown in 
Figure 11. The adjacency matrix A  and incidence matrix 'A  can be obtained based 
on Equation (3) and (4), respectively. 












=
0000
1000
1000
1110
A        












=
11100
01001
10010
00111
'A  
The adjacency matrix of the directed graph is asymmetric due to the directions 
of the power flow on transmission lines. 
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Figure 11 4-bus Power System and its Graph Model 
 
3.5 Summary 
This section reviewed the basic concepts of graph theory and the typical 
applications of graph theory in power system. The power system can be modeled as 
directed graph network based on the power flow results. With the help of linear algebra, 
the adjacency matrix and incidence matrix are formulated in order to study the 
modeled topological network of the power system.  
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4. WEIGHTED VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS∗
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
As described in section 2, most cascading outages have two stages: steady state 
and transient state. Steady state is a period of slowly evolving successive events, 
during which the cascading outages may be prevented if system operator understand 
the accurate system conditions and takes remedial actions. This dissertation proposes 
an improved approach, weighted vulnerability analysis method to evaluate the 
vulnerability of the individual element and the whole system. The weights for each 
vulnerability index are based on vertex and edge betweenness centrality. Those weight 
values provide a combined consideration of both electrical characteristics in power 
systems and topology parameters in graph representation of the power network.  
The traditional vulnerability index and margin index are reviewed in section 4.2. 
Section 4.3 discusses how to determine the weighting factor for the proposed weighted 
vulnerability analysis method. Section 4.4 provides the case study and summary is 
given in section 4.5 
4.2 Review of Vulnerability Index [64] 
                                                 
∗ Part of the material in this section is reprinted from “Static Security Analysis based on 
Weighted Vulnerability Index” by Chengzong Pang and Mladen Kezunovic, Presented 
in IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, Detroit, MI, USA, July 2011, 
©2011 IEEE. 
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Vulnerability index and margin index are proposed by Dr. Song to represent 
comprehensive and quantitative vulnerability and security information of the 
individual part and whole system [37], [64]. Since there are no weighs in the 
definitions of MIs, we only give the review of the concept of vulnerability index. For 
the detailed discusses on vulnerability index and margin index, please refer to the 
literature [37] and [64].  
At the generator level, vulnerability indices for real power output, reactive 
power output and generation loss and margin indices for real and reactive power 
outputs were considered. At the bus level, vulnerability indices for bus voltage 
performance, loadability and load loss and margin indices for bus voltage performance 
and loadability were presented. Islanding and isolated buses due to the line outages 
were considered in the load loss part. At the transmission line level, vulnerability 
indices for line real power, reactive power, line charging, line bus voltage angle 
difference, line distance relay performance, and line-off influence were discussed. 
Given a system with “m” generators, “n” buses, “p” lines and “q” loads, the 
comprehensive Vulnerability Index (VI) sets are defined as below: 
4.2.1 Vulnerability Index for Generators 
N
i
iiPg
iPg Pg
Pg
N
W
VI 2
max,
,
, )(2
=
             
(5)
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, )(2
=
             
(6)
 
 iilossgenilossgen kWVI ,_,_ =               
(7)
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i
iPggen VIVIVIVI ++= ∑
=            
(8)
 
where  
iPgVI , :  VI of individual generator real power output  
iQgVI , :  VI of individual generator reactive power output  
ilossgenVI ,_ :  VI of individual generator loss 
genVI :  total VI of all generators  
iPgW , : weight of individual generator real power output 
iQgW , : weight of individual generator reactive power output 
ilossgenW ,_ : weight of individual generator loss influence 
iPg , iQg : individual generator real, reactive power output 
max,iPg : maximum real power output of generator 
max,iQg : maximum reactive power output of generator when iQg  is positive; minimum 
reactive power output of generator when iQg  is negative 
ik : 1 when generator is off, 0 when generator is on 
N : 1 in general 
4.2.2 Vulnerability Index for Buses 
N
i
sche
iiiV
iV V
VV
N
W
VI 2
lim,
,
, )(2 ∆
−
=
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iilossloadilossload rWVI ,_,_ =                 
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where  
iVVI , : VI of individual bus voltage magnitude  
iLoadabVI , : VI of individual load bus loadbility 
ilossloadVI ,_ : VI of individual load bus load loss  
busVI :  total VI of all buses 
iVW , : weight of individual bus voltage influence 
iLoadabW , : weight of individual bus loadability 
ilossloadW ,_ : weight of individual bus load loss influence 
iV : bus voltage magnitude 
sche
iV : scheduled bus voltage magnitude 
,limiV∆ : voltage variance limit 
iLoadabr , : bus loadability, which is defined as 
iL
ith
iLoadab Z
Z
r
,0
,
, =  
ithZ , : Thevenin equivalent system impedance  
iLZ ,0 : equivalent load impedance at steady state 
ir : load loss ratio, 0~1, 0: no loss; 1: completely loss 
N : 1 in general 
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4.2.3 Vulnerability Index for Branches 
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where  
iPfVI , : VI of individual line real power  
iQfVI , : VI of individual line reactive power  
iQcVI , : VI of individual line charging  
ianglineVI ,_ : VI of individual bus voltage angle difference at each line 
ilayVI ,Re : VI of individual line distance relay  
iofflineVI ,_ : VI of individual line outage influence 
lineVI : total VI of all lines 
iPfW , : weight of individual line real power influence 
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iQfW , : weight of individual line reactive power influence 
iQcW , : weight of individual line charging influence 
ianglineW ,_ : weight of individual line bus angle difference 
ilayW ,Re : weight of individual line distance relay  
iofflineW ,_ : weight of individual line off influence 
iPf , iQf , iSf : line real, reactive and apparent power 
max,iS : individual line transmission limit, which can be either thermal limit or transfer 
limit due to security constraints 
iQc : individual line charging 
ΣQ : total reactive power output of all generators, or total reactive power of the whole 
system 
iLa : individual bus voltage angle difference at each line 
max,iLa : bus voltage angle difference limit at each line 
isrd , : magnitude of normalized apparent impedance seen by distance relay from the 
sending end to receiving end of that line 
irsd , : magnitude of normalized apparent impedance seen by distance relay from the 
receiving end to sending end of that line 
ik : 1 when line is off, 0 when line is on 
The aggregate system vulnerability index can be presented by 
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 linebusgen VIVIVIVI ++=             (20)  
The larger the VI value, the more vulnerable the system condition. By 
calculating the different VI and MI values, the security for system-wide and individual 
elements could be obtained. 
4.3 Weighted Vulnerability Analysis 
In the traditional vulnerability index approach, the weights in VIs are set as one 
or chosen by system operators based on their experience. Like any other network, there 
are some buses and branches in the power system which are more critical than the 
others due to their locations, properties, and functions. They have more influences on 
the system security and hence should have larger weights than the others. It is not an 
easy task to identify the critical elements in power system based only on the operation 
experiences.  
The centrality indices have been introduced as an essential tool for the analysis 
of different networks [65][66]. For example, these centrality indices were designed to 
rank the actors according to their position in the network and interpreted as the 
prominence of actors embedded in a social structure [67]. It was an effective way to 
measure the critical degree of different elements in the network. In this section, a 
weighted vulnerability index for power system vulnerability analysis is proposed, 
which will apply graph-theoretic concept of betweenness centrality to power grid 
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topology. As discussed in section 3, the directed graph is formed with vertices 
representing busses and the edges representing transmission lines. The weights for 
each vulnerability index will be calculated based on the values of betweenness 
centralities for each bus and branch in power system. This way the weighted 
vulnerability index method is an effective tool to consider both the inherent electrical 
properties of power system and the network topological properties. 
4.3.1 Vertex Betweenness Centrality 
The concept of betweenness centrality was first defined by Freeman [68], where 
he defined a number of measures of centrality to find out how influential a person or 
group in a social network is. Betweenness centrality is one of these measures.  
For the given graph ( )EVG ,= , the vertex betweenness centrality ( )vBC  of 
a vertex Vv∈  is the sum over all pairs of vertices Vwu ∈, , of the fraction of 
shortest paths between u  and w  that pass through vertex v , which is shown as: 
( ) ( )∑
≠≠
∈
=
vwu
Vwu uw
uw vvBC
, σ
σ              (21) 
where ( )vuwσ  denotes the total number of shortest path between vertex u  and w
that pass through v , and uwσ denotes the total number of shortest paths between u  
and w . 
4.3.2 Edge Betweenness Centrality 
The edge betweenness centrality ( )eBC  of a edge Ee∈  is the sum over all 
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pairs of vertices Vwu ∈, , of the fraction of shortest paths between u  and w  that 
pass through edge e , which is shown as: 
( ) ( )∑
≠
∈
=
wu
Vwu uw
uw eeBC
, σ
σ              (22) 
where ( )euwσ  denotes the total number of shortest path between vertex u  and w
that pass through e , and uwσ denotes the total number of shortest paths between u  
and w . 
4.3.3 Betweenness Calculation Example 
Take the example of a graph with five vertices and five edges shown in Figure 
12. The vertex betweenness centrality of node b  is calculated as: 
( ) ( )
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Similarly, the edge betweenness centrality of edge ab  is calculated as: 
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Figure 12 A Graph with Five Vertices and Five Edges 
 
4.3.4 Weights Calculation 
As already mentioned, the vertex and edge betweenness centrality are the 
standard measures for the influence of a vertex or an edge over the rest of the system. 
The vertices and edges with higher betweenness centralities indicate that they have 
relatively higher importance than the other elements within the graph network. By 
applying the betweenness centralities of buses and transmission lines to the power 
system topology model, the high-impact buses and transmission lines would be 
identified, which could be used to calculate the weights for the weighted vulnerability 
index approach proposed in this dissertation. 
When modeling power system into a topology model, the generators and buses 
are identified as nodes and the transmission lines are modeled as the edges. So the 
weights for VIs of generators and buses will be calculated based on vertex betweenness 
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centrality; the weights for VIs of branches will be calculated based on edge 
betweenness centrality. 
Considering whether the value of betweenness centrality is becoming large with 
the increasing number of buses in the power system, the normalized vertex and edge 
betweenness centralities are used to the real world implementation. The normalized 
vertex and edge betweenness centralities are defined as: 
( ) ( )( )( )21_ −−= nn
vBCvNormBC             (23) 
( ) ( )( )( )21_ −−= nn
eBCeNormBC             (24) 
where n is the total number of nodes in the power system. 
The detailed procedures of the proposed method to calculate the weights are: 
• Run power flow analysis to get the direction of power flow on each 
transmission line; 
• Model the power system as a directed graph according to the graph 
principles; 
• For each pair of vertices ),( wu , compute all shortest paths between 
them; 
• For each pair of vertices ),( wu , determine the fraction of shortest paths 
that pass through the vertex in question; 
• Sum this fraction over all pairs of vertices ),( wu  to get the betweenness 
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centrality for the vertex in question; 
• Propagate the calculation to all the vertices and edges  to get the 
betweenness centralities of whole network; 
• Normalize the values of betweenness centralities; 
• Add the normalized betweenness centrality values to the original weights 
for each VIs of generators, buses, and branches. 
4.4 Case Study 
The IEEE 118-bus test system is used to demonstrate the performance of 
proposed approach. Figure 13 shows the IEEE 118-bus system configuration. The 
detailed system configuration, base power flow data and machine data can be found in 
Appendix B [69]-[71].  
4.4.1 Calculation of Betweenness Centrality  
After obtaining the power flow results either from power system analysis or 
from state estimation, the basic directed graph-based model of power system is 
obtained with the directions of power flow on each transmission line. The vertex and 
edge betweenness centrality is computed according to the adjacency matrix of the 
power system. The distributions of vertex and edge betweenness centrality with 
descending sort are shown in Figure 14 and Figure 15, respectively. 
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Figure 13 IEEE 118-bus System Configuration 
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Figure 14 Vertex Betweenness Distribution for IEEE 118-bus System 
 
Figure 15 Edge Betweenness Distribution for IEEE 118-bus System 
54 
 
 
Figure 14 and Figure 15 show that there are a small number of vertices and 
edges that have high betweenness centrality values, which means they have 
high-impacts to the power system grid. The real world power system holds the same 
properties found in a small set of buses and transmission lines, which carry 
significantly higher importance compared to the remaining parts of the system. For 
example, Bus 77 has the highest value of vertex betweenness centrality. It has a very 
important topological position in the network. 
Regarding topological features, betweenness centralities of buses and 
transmission lines are good measurements of the influence of selected buses and 
transmission lines over the rest of the system. Regarding electrical features, the 
vulnerability indices can provide precise vulnerability measure for individual system 
element and the whole system performance. Certainly, it is possible that some 
important nodes or branches may have lower value of betweenness centrality. However, 
the vulnerability index calculation is capable of detecting all the vulnerable elements. 
For example, Bus 89 will be very important node if it had a great amount of generation 
attached to it. The value of its betweenness centrality is not large considering its 
topological role in this network. However, from Equation (5), large generator means 
high value of max,iPg . So any major loss of generation in this node will affect the value 
of iPgVI , and iQgVI , of this generator. This node has low-value betweenness centrality 
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bus still can be picked out as vulnerable element due to its abnormal condition. 
4.4.2 Weighted Vulnerability Analysis for Different Load Conditions  
For the IEEE 118-bus test system, we compare the weighted vulnerability index 
values for three difference cases:  
• Case A: base load; 
• Case B: 1.1 times the base load ; 
• Case C: 1.2 times the base load.  
The real and reactive power outputs for generators increase with the same 
corresponding  ratio to balance the increasing load. When defining the case study, the 
following assumptions are taken: 
• The branch transfer limit is 3.0 p.u.; 
• Voltage variance is 0.075 p.u.; 
• Bus voltage angle difference limit for transmission line is set as 40 degrees.   
Table 2 shows the results of weighted vulnerability index values for the three 
cases under different load conditions. Besides the system total vulnerability index (
totalVI ), Table I also shows the results of some individual vulnerability indices.  
From the results of Table 2, we can see that the whole power system is getting 
more vulnerable when the load is increasing. To balance the load, generators provide 
more real and reactive power. The power flow and bus voltage angle differences at 
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transmission lines are also increasing. The case studies show that weighted 
vulnerability analysis is a good way to assess the system security under different load 
conditions. 
 
Table 2  Weighted Vulnerability Index Values under Different Load Conditions  
 
4.4.3 Weighted Vulnerability Analysis for N-1 Contingency  
For the same IEEE 118-bus system, N-1 static contingency analysis is performed 
to evaluate our proposed weighted vulnerability analysis approach. For the simple 
demonstration, we only apply line outages for this case study. From the topological 
analysis, we can find that there are some branches whose tripping will result in 
islanding, such as the branches B9-10 which connect generator G1. In our case study, 
we only rank the non-islanding contingencies. Table 3 shows the results of the 
weighted vulnerability index values for top five vulnerable line outages. The results of 
 totalVI  LoadabVI  PgVI  QgVI  PfVI  anglineVI _  
Case A 30.1043 4.8454 3.6525 5.3471 7.2893 0.9987 
Case B 37.8324 5.8354 4.4506 8.7768 8.8612 1.2367 
Case C 50.7279 6.9125 5.3365 16.8603 10.5993 1.5059 
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same individual vulnerability index in Table 2 are also given in Table 3. From the 
results we can see that the top two vulnerable line outages are the branches connected 
with bus 81, which holds the very important topological position based on the rank of 
vertex betweenness centrality. 
 
Table 3  Weighted Vulnerability Index Values for N-1 Contingency Analysis 
 
Line Outage Number totalVI  LoadabVI  PgVI  QgVI  PfVI  anglineVI _  
L126  
(B68-81) 
53.6543 4.9733 3.8320 24.9428 8.4276 1.5278 
L127  
(B81-80) 
53.5619 4.9829 3.8320 24.9225 8.4276 1.5278 
L51 
(B38-37) 
48.7722 5.0594 3.6968 21.4290 7.8072 1.2866 
L50 
 (B34-37) 
40.4250 4.9092 3.6555 14.6525 7.3430 1.0031 
L116  
(B69-75) 
39.9103 5.0902 3.6627 13.5047 7.4511 1.0719 
 
4.5 Summary 
This section proposes the weighted vulnerability analysis to identify the most 
vulnerable components when evaluating system-wide security situation under different 
conditions. Vertex and edge betweenness centrality have been proven to be a good 
measure of the importance of a bus or transmission line in the power system over the 
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rest of the network. There is a small portion of buses and lines that have high-impacts 
on the power system. The proposed weighted vulnerability index method could provide 
a comprehensive representation of power system vulnerability information, which 
would consider both the topological properties and electrical properties of power 
system. Case studies demonstrate that proposed method can be used in power system 
static security analysis, which helps system operators to evaluate the system operating 
condition and find most vulnerable elements. 
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5. PARALLEL CORRIDOR SEARCH BASED ON GRAPH PARTITIONING 
 
5.1 Introduction 
During cascading outage, tripping a highly loaded transmission line will cause 
a larger transient and a larger steady-state redistribution of power flow, which may 
cause power swing occurring and leading to relay misoperation. Moreover, the impact 
on the operating margins of other components is larger if the power system is more 
stressed. In this section, a fast parallel corridor detection method is proposed to 
identify the most severe transmission lines after power flow redistribution when one 
line was tripped. The proposed method is based on graph partitioning. Section 5.2 
introduces the graph partitioning based on contributions. The proposed parallel 
corridor search method is presented in Section 5.3. Case study and summary are given 
in Section 5.4 and 5.5, respectively.  
5.2 Graph Partitioning based on Contributions 
The Power system topological model introduced in Section 3 can be partitioned 
into different zones with homogenous characteristics, which is called state graph. The 
graph partitioning is done by searching the domain of each generator, the common of 
buses and links between commons. The concepts of generator domain and bus 
common were proposed by Kirschen, et al. [38] to determine which generators are 
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supplying a particular load, how much use each generator is making of a transmission 
line, and what is each generator’s contribution to the system losses. These concepts are 
used here for fast search for parallel corridor after line tripping  during cascading 
outages. The introduction about the concepts of domain of a generator, common of 
buses, and links is given as follows [38]: 
5.2.1 Domain of a Generator 
The domain of a generator is defined as the set of buses which are reached by 
power produced by this generator. Based on the direction of power flow on each 
transmission line, if it is possible to find a path through the network from the studied 
generator to the bus, the power from the studied generator can reach this bus. 
Take an example of a 6-bus test system, which is shown in Figure 16. Under 
the given directions of power flow, the domain of generator A includes all the buses: 
Bus 1-6; the domain of generator B includes Bus 3, 4, 5, and 6; the domain of 
generator C only includes Bus 6 since no power can be delivered to other buses. It is 
normal that there is a significant overlap among the domains of different generators.  
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Figure 16 One Line Diagram 6-bus System with Power Flow 
 
For large system, the fast search algorithm to determine the domain for each 
generator was proposed in [38]: 
Place the bus where the generator is connected on the open list 
While there are busses on the open list do: 
Remove the first bus from the open list 
Add this bus to the domain of the generator 
Loop over all the branches connected to this bus; 
 If the power on this branch flows away from this bus and if the bus at  
opposite end of the branch is not yet part of the domain, then: 
    Add the opposite buses to the list of open buses. 
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   End if 
End loop 
End while 
5.2.2 Common of Buses 
A common is defined as a set of contiguous buses supplied by the same 
generators. Unconnected sets of buses supplied by the same generators are treated as 
separate commons. A bus belongs to one and only on common. The rank of a common 
is defined as the number of generators supplying power to the busses comprising this 
common. It can never be lower than one or higher than the number of generators in the 
system.  
Take the same example of 6-bus system, it has three commons as shown in 
Figure 17: Common 1 includes Bus 1 and 2, which are supplied by generator A only; 
Common 2 includes Bus 3, 4, and 5, which are supplied by both generator A and B; 
Common 3 only includes Bus 6, which is supplied by generator A, B, and C.  
Similarly, the fast searching algorithm was proposed in [38] to determine the 
common of buses for large power system: 
Determine the domain of each generator 
Record with each bus the generators which supply this bus 
Loop over all the buses  
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If this bus is not yet part of a common, then:  
 Create a new common based on the generators supplying this bus  
Recursively propagate this common to all the buses connected to this 
bus 
  End if 
End loop 
 
 
Figure 17 Commons for the 6-bus System 
 
5.2.3 Links between Commons 
After determining the domain of each generator and common of buses, each 
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branch either connects two busses which are part of the same common (internal to the 
common) or connects two buses which are part of different commons (external to the 
common). The concept of link is defined as one or more external branches connecting 
the same commons. Links have two properties:  
• The actual flows in all the branches of a link are all in the same 
direction.  
• The actual flow in a link is always from a common with lower rank to a 
common with higher rank. 
For the same 6-bus system shown in Figure 16, there are three links in this 
system: Link 1 includes Branch 1-3 and 2-5, which connects Common 1 and 2; Link 2 
includes Branch 4-6 and 5-6, which connects Common 2 and 3; Link 3 only includes 
Branch 2-6, which connects Common 1 and 3. 
5.3 Parallel Corridor Search Method 
5.3.1 State Graph of Power System  
Under the given power flow directions, the procedures of determining the 
domain of each generator, the common of buses and links between commons, will 
produce unique sets of domains, commons, and links. If the commons are represented 
as nodes and the links as branches, the power system topological network will be 
simplified into a state graph, which is a directed and acyclic graph. The link can only 
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go from a common supplied by fewer generators to a common supplied by more 
generators [38].  
For the same 6-bus system shown in Figure 16, the directed acyclic state graph 
is shown in Figure 18.   
 
21 2 31
3
 
Figure 18 State Graph for the 6-bus System 
 
5.3.2 Parallel Corridor Search Method 
From the state graph shown in Figure 18, some commons generate power and 
function as source, like Common 1; some commons absorb power and function as load, 
like Common 3; some commons transmit power from one common to the other 
common, like Common 2. It is possible that the source common also encompasses load 
buses or the load common also includes generator buses. To view the situation as 
whole, each common has the homogenous characteristic. 
The proposed fast search method for parallel corridor can only work when the 
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tripped transmission line is external to the commons, which means it belongs to one 
link in the state graph. For those transmission lines internal to a common, the weighted 
vulnerability analysis method proposed in Section 4 will be used.  
The detailed procedures of the proposed method to find the parallel corridors 
are: 
• Identify the link that the tripped transmission line belongs to; 
• Identify the source common and load common that the identified link 
connected, which are called key commons; 
• Search other links which are connected to the same source common and/or 
load common in the state graph of the power system, which are called key 
links; 
• Identify the transmission lines comprised in those key links and commons. 
The set of these transmission lines is defined as the parallel corridor related to 
the tripped branch. The search procedures could be done without running any power 
flow analysis. They are only running topological search based on adjacent matrix.   
For example, in the 6-bus system shown in Figure 16, if branch 4-6 is tripped 
due to overload, the parallel corridor from the key links is the set of branch 2-6 and 
branch 5-6, based on the state graph shown in Figure 18. 
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5.4 Case Study 
The standard IEEE 39-bus New England system [72] is used for case study. 
Figure 19 shows the IEEE 39-bus system configuration. The detailed system data, base 
power flow data and machine data can be found in Appendix C.  
 
 
Figure 19 IEEE 39-bus New England System Configuration 
 
For the typical normal operation mode, Table 4 shows the domain of different 
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generators. Bi ( 393,2,1 =i ) represents Bus i. Figure 20 shows the commons of 
buses and the related links. Figure 21 shows the generated state graph. The parallel 
corridor for tripped branch can be found by searching those links between commons.   
 
Table 4  Domain of each Generator for IEEE 39-bus New England System 
 
Generator Domain of Generator 
G30 B1, B2, B3, B4, B8, B9, B30, B39 
G31 B4, B5, B6, B7, B8, B31 
G32 B4, B5, B6, B7, B8, B10, B11, B12, B13, B14, B15, B32 
G33 B3, B4, B15, B16, B17, B18, B19, B20, B27, B33 
G34 B20, B34 
G35 B3, B4, B15, B16, B17, B18, B21, B22, B23, B24, B27, B35 
G36 B3, B4, B15, B16, B17, B18, B23, B24, B27, B36 
G37 B1, B2, B3, B4, B8, B9, B25, B26, B27, B37, B39 
G38 B26, B27, B28, B29, B38 
G39 B8, B9, B39 
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Based on the state graph shown in Figure 21, the parallel corridors due to 
tripping any line in the links could be determined. Table 5 shows result for three case 
studies with tripping branch L3 (B3-2), L8 (B14-4), and L20 (16-15), respectively. As 
the result, the parallel corridors from key links and commons are provided in this table. 
 
 
Figure 20 Commons and Links of IEEE 39-bus New England System 
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Figure 21 State Graph of IEEE 39-bus New England System 
 
Table 5  Parallel Corridors Case Study 
 
Faulted Line Key Links Key Commons 
Lines from 
Key Links 
Lines from Key 
Commons 
L3 
(B3-2) 
C2-3, C2-9, 
C1-6, C1-14, 
C1-18  
C1, C2 
L2(B39-1), 
L4(B25-2), 
L5(B4-3), 
L6(B18-3), 
L44(B2-30) 
L1(B2-1) 
L8 
(B14-4) 
C2-3, C3-4, 
C4-7, C7-8 
C3, C7 
L5(B4-3), 
L7(B5-4), 
L12(B11-6), 
L19(B15-14) 
L16(B11-10), 
L17(B13-10), 
L18(B14-13), 
L35(B12-11), 
L36(B12-13), 
L38(B10-32) 
L20 
(B16-15) 
C7-8, C2-9, 
C9-10, 
C9-13, 
C9-12, 
C9-16 
C8, C9 
L6(B18-3), 
L19(B15-14), 
L22(B19-16), 
L23(B21-16), 
L24(B24-16), 
L26(B27-17) 
L21(B17-16), 
L25(B18-17) 
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Taking the case example of tripping branch L8 (B14-4), the power flow on this 
transmission line will be distributed to other branches. Parallel corridors search method 
provides the list of most vulnerable lines due to this event as shown in Table 5. In order 
to verify the results, the full AC power flow analysis is used to check the numerical 
results of power flow re-distribution. Table 6 shows the active power flow results for 
the parallel corridors due to tripping branch L8 (B14-4). The detailed parameters for 
running the power flow can be found in Appendix C.  
From Table 6, we can conclude that the identified parallel corridors suffer most 
of the power flow re-distribution. Branch L38 (B10-32) is a generator bus, and the flow 
on this line did not change much due to the generator output limit.  
5.5 Summary 
This section proposed a parallel corridor search method to quickly identify the 
most vulnerable components after tripping any transmission line. The proposed method 
is based on topological partitioning in graph theory. The power system topology model 
can be simplified into state graph after searching the domains for each generator, 
commons for each bus, and links between commons. The parallel corridor will be 
found by searching the key links connected to the same source common and/or load 
common and the key commons in the state graph of the power system. The whole 
search process is executed without any power flow calculation, which makes the 
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proposed method have the property of increased speed. 
 
Table 6  Full AC Power Flow Results   
 
Line 
Pre-fault Power Flow 
(p.u.) 
Post-fault Power Flow 
(p.u.) 
Percentage of Change 
L5(B4-3) -0.749835623 -1.67608256 123.53% 
L7(B5-4) 1.630748973 3.331610673 104.30% 
L12(B11-6) 3.440732315 5.138402971 49.34% 
L16(B11-10)  -3.46930441 -5.025156839 44.85% 
L17(B13-10) -3.026452464 -1.469305015 -51.45% 
L18(B14-13) -2.957199385 -1.254787113 -57.57% 
L19(B15-14) -0.325868494 -1.252683894 284.41% 
L35(B12-11) -0.021880128 0.12775897 683.90% 
L36(B12-13)  -0.063437532 -0.21312768 235.97% 
L38(B10-32) -6.499999421 -6.499999161 0.00% 
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6. ENHANCED DISTANCE RELAY SCHEME USED FOR VULNERABLE 
PARTS IN POWER SYSTEM∗
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Power system is beginning to reach its security limit when losing major parts 
resulting in a serious of problems. The large fluctuation of power, which is known as 
power swing, is one of the most significant consequences. It may impact the behavior 
of distance relays and jeopardize the system security level. The vulnerable components 
in power system during cascading outage could be identified by using weighted 
vulnerability analysis proposed in Section 4, and parallel corridor search method 
proposed in Section 5. Those vulnerable branches operate in stressed conditions and 
their relay operations should be paid attention to. This section proposes enhanced fault 
detection method during power swing to improve the security of distance relay. Section 
6.2 reviews the distance relay behavior during power swing. The principle of proposed 
fast distance relay scheme for fault detection during power swing is discussed in detail 
in Section 6.3. Section 6.4 discusses the implementation of detection method. Case 
study given in Section 6.5 and Section 6.6 provides the summary.   
                                                 
∗ Part of the material in this section is reprinted from “Fast Distance Relay Scheme for 
Detecting Symmetrical Fault during Power Swing” by Chengzong Pang and Mladen 
Kezunovic, Power Delivery, IEEE Transactions on, vol.25, no.4, pp.2205-2212, Oct. 
2010, doi: 10.1109/TPWRD.2010.2050341, ©2010 IEEE., with permission from IEEE. 
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6.2 Distance Relay Behavior during Power Swing 
6.2.1 Power Swing 
Power system security and stability are becoming even more challenging and 
important characteristics due to the increasing complexity of power system operations. 
Since transmission lines are the vital links that enable delivering of electrical power to 
the end users, improved dependability and security of transmission line relays is 
required. According to the historical data [73], relay misoperation contributes to 70 
percent of the major disturbances in the United States. Finding effective means to 
monitor and improve distance relay operations is very important for understanding and 
mitigating relay misoperations on high voltage transmission lines. 
Power swing is a phenomenon of large fluctuations of power between two areas 
of a power system. It is referred as the variation of power flow. Figure 22 shows the 
simulation example of voltage waveform from power swing observed at relay location. 
Power swing often occurs with the instability of synchronous generators. Transmission 
line faults, line switching, loss of generator, and loss of heavy load will result in 
sudden changes to electrical power. In this case, the mechanical power input to 
generators remains relatively constant. These system disturbances cause oscillations in 
machine rotor angles and can result in severe power flow swings. Depending on the 
severity of the disturbance and the actions of power system controls, the power swing 
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can be categorized into stable power swing and unstable power swing. In stable power 
swing, the system may remain stable and return to a new equilibrium state 
experiencing. Unstable power swing could cause large separation of generator rotor 
angles, large swings of power flows, large fluctuations of voltages and currents, and 
eventual loss of synchronism between groups of generators [74].  
The occurrence of power swings is very difficult to predict since they are quite 
unexpected [75]-[78]. When power swing takes place, the apparent impedance 
measured by a distance relay may move away from the normal load area and into one 
or more of the distance relay operating characteristics. This may cause unintended trips 
[79]-[81]. For example, the Northeast Blackout in 2003 was caused by distance relays 
operation in zone 3 under the overload and power swing condition, which stressed the 
system and made it collapse at the end [1]. 
To ensure the security of operation, most modern distance relays detect and 
block the operation during the power swing [82].  If a fault occurs during the power 
swing, the distance relay should be able to detect the fault and operate correctly. In that 
case it is necessary to unblock the relay during power swing. The procedure is easy to 
implement for unsymmetrical faults, since the negative and zero sequence components 
do not exist during power swing, which can be used as fault detection criterion. 
However, it is much more difficult to identify symmetrical fault during stable power 
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swing, which may delay the operation of relay [83].  
 
 
Figure 22 Voltage Simulation Example of Power Swing Observed by Relay 
 
To solve this problem, many schemes using different methods have been 
proposed. Mechraoui and Thomas presented fault detection method based on load 
angle differences identification [77]. They did not consider the symmetrical fault in 
their case studies. Benmouyal et al presented a fault detector based on tracking the 
power swing center voltage (SCV) [84]. Choosing the appropriate thresholds is still 
very difficult to implement. Su et al introduced an improved method for a fast detector 
[85]. Their scheme still needs two cycles to finish the fault detection, which is not good 
enough when applied in Extremely High Voltage (EHV) system. Brahma introduced 
the use of wavelet transform (WT) to detect the symmetrical fault quickly and reliably 
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[86], but the sampling rate of 40.96 kHz is needed to satisfy all the cases studied. 
6.2.2 Distance Relay under Power Swing 
The responses of the power system to different disturbances depend on both the 
initial operating state of the system and the severity of the disturbances [87]. The 
steady state power system operates at an equilibrium, which maintains the balance 
between the generated and consumed power. When system disturbances happen, such 
as various faults, transmission line switching, sudden loss of load, loss of generators, 
loss of excitation, etc., the mechanical power input to the generators remains constant 
for a short time under those sudden changes in power system. This will cause the 
oscillations in machine rotor angles and result in power flow swings [75], [88].  
Power swing is a variation in power flow which occurs when generator rotor angles are 
advancing or retracting relative to each other. It is possible for one generator, or group 
of generators that terminal voltage angles (or phases) go past 180 degrees with respect 
to the rest of the connected power system, which is known as pole slipping. The power 
swing is considered stable if pole slipping does not happen and system remains stable 
and returns to a new equilibrium state [89]. However, large power swings, no matter 
whether they are stable or unstable, will cause large fluctuations of voltages and 
currents, which may leads to relay misoperations and finally result in loss of 
synchronism between groups of generators. 
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Distance relays play an important role in assuring stability of power systems by 
eliminating faults on transmission lines leading to instability. The distance relays are 
proven to be influenced by power swing [75], [83]-[85].When and only when the faults 
occur within the desired zone, distance relay should isolate the faults. It should not trip 
the line during power swing caused by the disturbances outside the protected line. That 
is the reason why power swing blocking function is intergraded in most of modern 
distance relays, so that the relays shall be blocked while power swing without faults is 
occurring. 
Either stable or unstable power swing will have impacts on distance relay 
judgment. The detailed reasoning and an example of two machine system are given in 
[90]. 
If there is no fault on the considered transmission line, the impedance seen by 
distance relay at bus is [91]: 
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From the above equation, the apparent impedance cZ seen by relay is 
determined by two variables: the magnitude ratio ( n
m
V
V  ) and the angle difference 
( nm n mθ θ θ= − ) of the bus voltages at the two ends. Since the bus voltages will oscillate 
during power swing, cZ will also vary accordingly. The plots of cZ  trajectories in the 
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R X−  plane with respect to voltage magnitude ratios and angle differences is shown 
in Figure 23 [91], under the condition of 1 80LZ = ∠
 . If the power swing causes the 
angle difference large enough, the impedance seen by relay will reach the zone settings 
and relay will misoperate. An example of actual impedance trajectories during a stable 
power swing and an unstable power swing is shown in Figure 24. 
 
 
Figure 23 cZ Trajectory in the R X−  Phase 
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Figure 24 Impedance Trajectory during Stable and Unstable Power Swing 
 
During power swing, if certain values of the magnitude ratio and angle 
difference are satisfied, the impedance seen by relay will reach the zone settings and 
relay misoperation will happen. Traditional method for power swing blocking is to 
measure the rate of change of impedance through the zones of relay [92]. The speed of 
impedance moving during power swing is slower than during fault condition. This is 
the basic theory of how a relay may be able to distinguish the power swing from fault. 
However, as Brahma mentioned in [86], if a symmetrical fault occurs during a power 
swing, it is not possible to detect it based on the mentioned principle because both 
power swing and symmetrical fault are both balanced phenomena, which may result in 
the relay not being able to “see” the fault and clear it. 
6.3 Principle of Enhanced Fault Detection Method 
The system frequency during power swing only varies over the range around 
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the nominal frequency, which can be as high as 4-7 Hz [84]. The occurrence of fault, 
on the contrary, will generate transient signals in the waveforms of currents and 
voltages. The type and degree of existences of transient signals are largely determined 
by the fault location, fault duration, incidence angle, fault resistance, and system 
pre-fault conditions. Based on the difference in frequency component behavior, it is 
feasible to detect the symmetrical fault during power swing by extracting the high 
frequency components from the voltage and current waveform. 
Ultra-high-speed (UHS) protection schemes based on the traveling wave 
detection techniques have been introduced [93]-[96]. Some are limited by their 
weakness in reliability and feasibility. With the development of signal processing tools, 
the improved UHS protection schemes such as Mathematical Morphology (MM) based 
method [97], WT based method [98], [99] have been proposed. Although traveling 
wave protection scheme may not substitute the traditional protection methods right 
now, it provides a feasible method for fault detection with fast response and immunity 
to power swing and other influences. 
Wavelets are one of the relatively new mathematical tools for signal processing 
[100]. Wavelet based signal processing technique is an effective tool for power system 
transient analysis and power system relaying. The applications of wavelet transform in 
power system have been reported for fault detection, fault classification, power system 
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disturbance modeling and identification, power quality analysis, etc.[74], [90], 
[100]-[102]. This section presents a fast detection method for symmetrical faults by 
using wavelet analysis to extract the high frequency components from the 
fault-induced voltage and current traveling waves propagating along transmission line. 
6.3.1 Traveling Wave Theory during Fault 
When a fault occurs in power system, the voltage and current signals could be 
decomposed into two parts: the pre-fault steady-state component and the fault injected 
component, or often called superimposed component. The superimposed component 
can be expressed in terms of traveling waves, including forward travelling wave and 
backward travelling wave. Figure 25 shows a single line diagram of a transmission 
system.  
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Figure 25 Diagram for Single Phase Transmission Line  
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When fault occurs, the traveling wave will propagate along the line. The wave 
propagation can be obtained by solving the partial differential equations, which are 
expressed as [99]: 
( ) ( ) ( )vtxuvtxutxu ++−= −+,            (26) 
( ) ( ) ( )( )vtxuvtxu
Z
txi +−−= −+
0
1,           (27) 
where v is the surge velocity, 
00
1
CL
v = , 0Z is line surge impedance, 
0
0
0 C
LZ = , 
0L  and 0C are the inductance and capacitance per unit length, x  represents the 
distance that a surge travels away from the fault point. +u and −u are the forward and 
backward travelling wave, respectively, which can be derived from equation (26) and 
(27) as: 
( )iZuu ∆+∆=+ 02
1               (28) 
( )iZuu ∆−∆=− 02
1               (29) 
where u∆ , i∆  are the fault injected voltage and current, respectively. They can be 
obtained by subtracting the steady-state components from the post fault signals [103], 
and the steady-state components are those voltage and current waveforms one cycle 
before the fault. Thus the forward and backward travelling waves can be calculated 
easily and fast. 
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6.3.2 Wavelet Transform Analysis 
Wavelet transform (WT) is a relatively new and efficient signal processing tool, 
which was introduced first at the beginning of the 1980s [104]. The application of 
wavelet-based techniques has been widely spread in the field of mathematics, physics 
and engineering because of its capability of time and frequency domain analysis, 
which is its unique characteristic. The fundamental theory and mathematics of the 
wavelet transform was extensively studied and can be found in literature [104]-[108]. 
The definition of continuous wavelet transform (CWT) for a given signal ( )tx  
with respect to a mother wavelet ( )tψ  (t) is: 
( ) dt
a
bttx
a
baCWT ∫
∞
∞−





 −= ψ2),(          (30) 
where a  is scaling (dilation) factor and b is the shifting (translation) factor. 
The application of continuous wavelet transform in engineering requires the 
feasibility evaluation. Similarly to discrete Fourier transform, a discrete wavelet 
transform (DWT) is proposed by adapting the discrete forms of t , a , and b in 
equation (28), which can be written as: 
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where m , n , and k are integer variables related to the number of samples in the 
input signal. The scaling and shifting factors changed to the functions of m , n , and 
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k .  
The performance of Wavelet transform highly depends on the selection of the 
mother wavelet. All mother wavelets have the common characteristics: the mother 
wavelet should be attenuating and oscillating [104]. To perform Wavelet transform, 
many approaches for the mother wavelet can be selected, such as Daubechies (Db), 
Symlets, Coiflets, Biorthogonas, etc [107]. The different mother wavelets will affect 
the performance of Wavelet-based methods. Selecting the appropriate mother wavelet 
is very important to implementing the wavelet analysis.  
Power swing is mostly the phenomena of low frequency oscillation. The fault 
voltage or current contains high frequency transient signals. The multi-resolution 
analysis (MRA) will be a best tool for decomposing the signal at the expected levels 
[106], by which the faulted-derived signals can be represented in terms of wavelets and 
scaling functions. Thus, we can easily extract the desired information from the input 
signals into different frequency bands related to the same time period.   
Considering an acquired digitized time signal ( )ty , the approximation coefficient 
(scaling coefficients) ( )nc j  and wavelet coefficient (detail coefficients) ( )nd j  after 
the decomposition at j scales can be computed as [100]: 
( ) ( ) ( )kcnkhnc j
k
j 12 −∑ −=             (32) 
( ) ( ) ( )kcnkgnd j
k
j 12 −∑ −=             (33) 
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where Jj ..., 2, ,1= . J is the total number of resolution levels (The maximum value of 
J is determined by the number of sampling points), ( )nh  and ( )ng are the low-pass 
and high-pass filter respectively. Figure 26 shows the procedure of two-scale 
decomposition using by MRA. 
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Figure 26 Diagram of MRA Decomposition into Two Scales 
 
In order to represent the high frequency component in its quantity, the wavelet 
energy spectrum is used to calculate the transient energy in different frequency band. 
From Parseval’s Theorem, the energy of the analyzed signal can be represented by the 
energy in each expansion components and their wavelet coefficients if the used scaling 
function and wavelets form an orthogonal basis, which can be shown as [100]:  
∫ ∑∑
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where ∑
∈
=
Zk
kjj dE
2
, is the norm value or the energy of the signal component at j
level after wavelet transform.  
Multi-resolution analysis is a hierarchical and fast solution. It can be 
implemented by a set of successive filter banks as shown above. An import issue 
remains for the wavelet analysis: choice of a suitable wavelet. A particular type of 
wavelet should be selected depending on the application purpose of wavelet analysis. 
The main concerns when selecting the appropriate wavelet are: 
• It should be one of the orthogonal wavelets.  
• It should be easy to implemented and with acceptable performance. 
When wavelet analysis is used to detect transient disturbances, the mother 
wavelet shape should be close to the shape of the detected disturbance in order to reach 
the higher efficiency. However, the proposed method in this section wants to extract 
the energy distribution at each frequency band in the detected signals. Thus an 
orthogonal wavelet should be adopted to satisfy energy conservation of the Parseval’s 
Theorem. Among those mother wavelets, Daubechies wavelet family is one of the 
most suitable orthogonal wavelets in multi-resolution analysis due to their powerful 
performance, which has been widely used in different fields [108]. Other orthogonal 
wavelets may also have the ability to function as well as Daubechies wavelets. But 
Daubechies wavelets are very easy to implement by using the fast wavelet transform 
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with remarkable performance [107].   
Different Daubechies wavelets have different filter lengths, which determined 
the performances of Daubechies wavelet family. The longer the length of the wavelet 
the higher the computation burden of the filter. The smoother the wavelet waveform in 
the time domain the better the localization capability in the frequency domain. 
Reference [109] discussed the comparison results in fault diagnosis using 
Daubechies-4 (Db4), Daubechies-8 (Db8), and Daubechies-20 (Db20) wavelets, which 
shows that the wavelet with longer filter length is superior to the shorter ones. 
However, the computation burden is also an important factor to be considered when 
choosing the wavelets to implement the fast detecting scheme. 
Based on these considerations, multi-resolution analysis based on Daubechies-8 
(Db8) wavelet shown in Figure 27 is selected for the investigations in this section. Db8 
wavelet is compactly represented in time, and this is good for the short and fast 
transient analysis due to its better localization performance in frequency [104]. It is 
relatively easy to localize and detect the fault part under power swing by extracting 
features of transients in the wavelet domain. 
6.4 Implementation of Detection Method 
The diagram of proposed symmetrical fault detection method based on 
travelling wave technique and wavelet transform is conceptually shown in Figure 28. 
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Figure 27 Daubechies-8 (Db8) Wavelet 
 
 
Figure 28 Implementation Diagram of Symmetrical Fault Detection Method 
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6.4.1 Data Acquisition 
The proposed symmetrical fault detection during power swing requires data 
acquisition for all three phase voltages and currents. Those data can be obtained 
directly from measurement units of advanced digital relays. Most wavelet transform 
based methods require high sampling rate. The detection method proposed in this 
section can be used in a wide range of sampling rates. Considering advanced digital 
relays using sampling rate of 10 kHz, the same sampling rate is selected in this study, 
which can satisfy the requirements of wavelet transform proposed in this scheme with 
good results. In order to avoid aliasing due to the fault transients and low sampling rate, 
an analog antialiasing filter needs to be employed before the sampling of the input 
waveforms coming from instrument transformers. There are many known solutions 
available for implementing the antialiasing filters, hence no further discussion is given. 
6.4.2 Modal Transformation 
In three phase power transmission line, the electromagnetic coupling exists 
among three phases. Thus when a fault occurs in one phase, transient currents will be 
induced in the other phases due to the mutual coupling. The induced currents may 
distort the travelling waves on each phase, and it’s difficult to solve the coupled 
equations describing wave propagation. Therefore, the modal transformation to 
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uncouple the dependent phase components into three independent propagation modes 
is adopted in the proposed scheme. Clarke transformation is selected for three phase 
voltage and current, which shows as: 
cbauTu ,,
1
,,0
−=βα                (35) 
cbaiTi ,,
1
,,0
−=βα                (36) 
where 1−T is called Clarke transformation matrix: 
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After Clarke transformation, three phase variables will be converted into earth 
mode 0 , and two aerial modes: α  and β . 0  mode is prone to frequency 
dispersion and is not appropriate to be used since our goal is to extract the high 
frequency components. Since a symmetrical fault is considered, choosing between the 
mode α or β is not a critical decision. Here the aerial mode α  is selected to be used 
with the voltage and current signals. 
6.4.3 Wavelet Transform Implementation 
As mentioned before, the frequency of the system varies over a range around 
the nominal frequency during power swing. The fault will result in transient 
components of the voltages and currents, which may typically be DC or higher 
harmonics. In order to implement the proposed method, the levels of wavelet transform 
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and the choice of key level for analysis are carefully studied. For a given signal, 
multi-resolution analysis based on Daubechies-8 (Db8) wavelet is performed. Different 
level components are the analysis results for different frequency bands, which can offer 
different information about given signals. Selection of sampling rate affects the 
frequency band for the wavelet transform. Based on the sampling rate of 10 kHz and 
Nyquist theorem, the wavelet level d1 will cover 2.5 kHz – 5 kHz. Our study shows 
that the d1 component from the wavelet transform is able to capture the energy of the 
transients for all kinds of faults, which includes symmetrical fault, and it is sensitive to 
the fault occurrence irrespective of the occurrence of power swing condition. However, 
the high frequency transient component will disperse up to 100 kHz, so higher 
sampling rate will be helpful to improve the detection reliability.  
When implementing the wavelet analysis, one cycle window data is calculated 
by wavelet transform. The moving speed of shifting data window can be set based on 
the requirements of system protection scheme. The proposed fault detection method 
could be running at point-by-point shifting, which is feasible with the aids of 
high-speed DSPs.  
Since the data for wavelet analysis is windowed discrete signal, the results after 
wavelet transform will have border distortion, which is shown in Figure 29. Although 
many extended signal methods have been used in FFT, WT and etc., such as 
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zero-padding, symmetric-padding, smooth padding, periodic-padding, none of them 
could eliminate the border distortion effects completely. For example, Figure 30 and 
Figure 31 show the results after WT with periodic-padding and symmetric-padding, 
respectively, in which border distortion still exists although it has been improved by 
those signal extending methods.  
 
 
Figure 29 Border Distortion Effect for Wavelet Analysis  
 
Figure 30 Periodic-padding for Wavelet Analysis  
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Figure 31 Symmetric-padding for Wavelet Analysis  
 
The detection scheme proposed in this section adopts a compromised method: 
discarding the first and last 10 coefficients in the d1 component after the wavelet 
transform. It will cause 1 ms time delay for the fault detection based on the sampling 
rate of 10 kHz. The proposed method is still fast enough to detect the symmetrical fault. 
The only factor to consider when introducing a detection lag is the time needed for 
calculations. The calculation burden is mainly coming from performing modal 
transform, wavelet transform, and wavelet energy spectrum. This is less than the 
calculation burden of newly transient-based ultra-high-speed directional protection 
relays that use the same wavelet transforms. It is estimated that they use less than 6000 
multiplication and 5500 addition operations, which can be completed within 1.5ms 
[99].The method proposed in this section is able to finish the fault detection within 2.5 
ms after fault occurs based on the sampling rate of 10 kHz. This detection scheme may 
be made more rapid with faster DSPs and higher sampling rate. For example, the time 
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delay for discarding the 10 points will be 0.1 ms based on the sampling rate of 100 
kHz. 
6.4.4 Fault Detection Criteria 
The criterion for the symmetrical fault detection is defined as:  
b
f
e E
E
k =                  (37) 
where fE  and bE  are the energy of the d1 wavelet component for the forward and 
backward travelling waves +u and −u respectively. According to the principles 
discussed above, fE  and bE  only exist after fault occurs, and are not only limited to 
symmetrical faults.  Because of the reflection effects at bus boundary, fE  is bigger 
than bE  after the reflection at the boundary. Thus the fault detection criteria will be 
defined as: if 0ee kk ≥ , the symmetrical fault occurs. When it is used in practice, in 
order to avoid the possible situation of dividing by zero, the values of fE  and bE are 
being monitored. If any of them is close to zero (for example, less than 510− ), value of 
ek is set to zero. The threshold value of 0ek  is determined by the bus reflection 
coefficient. Here 0ek is set to be 1.15 after large number of simulation trials. More test 
cases are discussed in Section 6.5. 
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6.5 Case Study 
6.5.1 Simulation of Power Swing 
In this section, the power system model for case study is based on the EMTP 
reference model for transmission line relay testing, which is introduced by the IEEE 
PES Power System Relaying Committee (PSRC) WG D10 [110]. This model is 
described as a “standard” system model, which can be used to generate uniform relay 
test scenarios. In order to generate the needed conditions, Alternative Transient 
Program (ATP) is used to simulate the power swing [111]. The one-line diagram of the 
studied system and its ATP model are shown in Figure 32 and Figure 33 respectively. 
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Figure 32 One-line Diagram of IEEE EMTP Reference Model  
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Figure 33 IEEE EMTP Reference Model in ATP  
 
6.5.2 Example Cases 
In this part, some case scenarios to test the performance of the proposed fault 
detection method during power swing are illustrated.  
Figure 34 shows typical power swing voltage waveform generated by the 
model discussed above with the 5-level multi-resolution wavelet analysis based on 
Db8. d1- d5 are the high frequency components at different wavelet level, respectively. 
It is obvious that wavelet d1 component is “quiet” during power swing. 
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Figure 34 5-level Db8 Wavelet Transform Results  
 
Figure 35 shows the three phase voltage of a symmetrical fault during power 
swing. The values of criteria factor ek  around the fault point are shown in Figure 36. 
In this case, there is at least one point that 0ee kk ≥ , which means a fault occurred 
during power swing. 
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Figure 35 3-phase Voltage Waveforms for a Symmetrical Fault during Power Swing  
 
 
Figure 36 Values of Criteria Factor ek  around the Fault Point 
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In order to validate that the proposed scheme is transparent to fault locations, a 
variety of scenarios under different locations has been conducted. Table 7 shows some 
typical simulation results for the three phase symmetrical fault under power swing. 
 
Table 7  Simulation Case for Different Fault Locations for Symmetrical Fault 
under Power Swing 
 
Case Fault Distance (mile) Maximum Value of ek  
1 0 1.2100 
2 4.5 1.2958 
3 13 1.3353 
4 19.5 1.2717 
5 42 2.2330 
 
The proposed scheme is also immune to the variety of fault types and locations, 
under both power swing and normal conditions. In order to validate the effectiveness 
of this scheme, the cases of one single-phase-to-ground fault (Fault AG) and one 
double-phase fault (Fault AB) are studied and results are equally good without loss of 
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generality. Table 8 shows the case of simulated results for different fault locations of 
Fault AG and Fault AB when power swing is absent and Table 9 shows the results for 
different locations when the power swing is present. All the results show the proposed 
scheme is effective under such conditions as well. 
 
Table 8  Simulation Case for Different Fault Locations under Normal Condition 
 
Case Fault Distance (mile) 
Maximum Value of ek  
Fault AG Fault AB 
1 0 1.2777 1.2765 
2 4.5 1.3142 1.2952 
3 13 1.3435 1.3566 
4 19.5 1.2705 1.2700 
5 42 2.2246 2.0778 
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Table 9  Simulation Case for Different Fault Locations under Power Swing 
 
Case Fault Distance (mile) 
Maximum Value of ek  
Fault AG Fault AB 
1 0 1.2454 1.2200 
2 4.5 1.3141 1.2951 
3 13 1.3440 1.3589 
4 19.5 1.2703 1.2720 
5 42 2.2097 2.2511 
 
6.6 Summary 
This section presents a novel and fast fault detection scheme to be used to 
improve dependability of a distance relay during power swing aiming at avoiding 
possible relay misoperations during power swing conditions. It extracts the travelling 
waves from transient signals induced by faults and calculates the energy of high 
frequency components extracted using the wavelet transform. The proposed scheme is 
very fast. It could detect the fault within 3 ms after the symmetrical fault occurs during 
power swing, which could be beneficial for system protection, especially in EHV 
system. The sampling rate for data acquisition can be as low as 10 kHz, which fits the 
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requirements of most modern microprocessor based distance relays. Higher sampling 
rate could offer better results. The implementation of the proposed scheme is straight 
forward since the theoretical research results may easily be transferred into practical 
application. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
This section has the discussion of the contributions and conclusions about what 
the contributions can be used for, and the future work directions as well. 
7.1 Achievements and Contributions 
Although the risk of large area cascading outages occurring is low, the 
consequences of cascading outages may have catastrophic social and economic 
impacts. Many researchers and engineers have put dedicated efforts to understanding 
the cascading outages and finding a feasible way to detect, prevent and mitigate them. 
This dissertation studied several major cascading blackouts in the world aiming at 
better understanding the mechanism of cascading outages, and presents an approach 
for fast detection and mitigation of cascading outages in power system. This approach 
could be integrated into the existing EMS functionality at the control center as the 
decision-making support tool for the system operators to better understand the 
unfolding events. The main contributions of this dissertation are summarized as 
follows: 
• Investigate the mechanism of cascading outages.  
This dissertation explored several major cascading blackouts in the world. By 
investigating the mechanism of cascading outages, it can be concluded that 
most cascading outages have two stages: steady-state progression and transient 
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progression stages. Steady state progress stage may give system operators 
enough time to evaluate the system condition, identify some vulnerable 
contingencies, take some control to increase the security level and prevent the 
possible cascading blackouts. 
• Develop the weighted vulnerability analysis method.  
Weighted vulnerability analysis method based on topology processing is 
proposed. It could provide a comprehensive evaluation for individual 
components as well as system-wide security situation under different conditions.  
The weights calculated from the vertex and edge betweenness centrality can 
present the importance of each bus and transmission line in the modeled power 
system topological network. The proposed weighted vulnerability analysis 
method can achieve higher accuracy since it considers both the topological 
properties and electrical properties of power systems. 
• Develop a method for fast search for parallel corridor after disturbance.  
Parallel corridor search method based on the simplified state graph after 
searching the domains for each generator, commons for each bus, and links 
between commons is proposed. It could quickly identify the most vulnerable 
components due to the large power flow redistribution by tripping a highly 
loaded transmission line and providing the precious time for the system 
106 
 
 
operator to take remedial actions if needed.  
• Propose a fast fault detection method for improvement of distance relay 
operation during power swing.  
Tripping a highly loaded transmission line may cause power swing occurring 
and leading to relay misoperation during cascading outages. A novel and fast 
fault detection scheme is proposed for distance relay during power swing. It 
could detect the fault with increased speed, which could be beneficial for 
system protection, especially in EHV system. The sampling rate for data 
acquisition can be as low as 10 kHz, which can be used in the existing 
microprocessor based distance relays. The implementation of the proposed 
scheme could reduce the risk of relay misoperations and improve relay 
dependability.  
7.2 Conclusions 
The purpose of this dissertation is to find some effective methods to help detect, 
prevent and mitigate power system cascading outages since the research in this area is 
still far from mature to better understand cascading outages. The contributions of this 
dissertation may benefit both theoretical research and practical applications in 
detection, prevention and mitigation of power system cascading outages. The 
following contributions can be obtained:   
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• Weighted vulnerability analysis could provide better system situational 
awareness and accurate information about the disturbance since it considered 
both electrical and topological properties.  
• Parallel corridor search method could identify the most vulnerable lines after 
power re-distribution, which will give operator time to take remedial actions. 
• New travelling wave and wavelet transform based fault detection could reduce 
the impact of relay misoperation. 
7.3 Suggestion for Future Research 
The research and study in this dissertation can be continued in the future. 
Extensive research and analysis tools are required for transient progress stage during 
cascading outage. The existing method is not fast and accurate enough to accomplish 
the transient analysis.  
The system-wide vulnerability analysis method is based on the outputs from 
state estimation. When implementing the proposed system-wide tools, the topology 
error processing should be considered when building the topological model of power 
system, and parameter error processing should be studied.  
For the local fault detection scheme during power swing, an adaptive method 
for determining the threshold value for the fault detection criterion should be 
developed, which could provide more accurate results. 
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All the proposed methods are programmed in Matlab. They need to be 
converted to high efficient programming code using different programming language 
when the field test is applied in the future.  
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APPENDIX A 
Nomenclature 
The nomenclature is used to provide the descriptions for the system data in 
following appendices. 
Type: 1-PQ bus; 2-PV bus; 3-Swing bus. 
LP , LQ : real and reactive parts of the load at buses, in MVA value. 
sB : shunt capacitor at buses, in MVA value. 
mV : bus voltage magnitudes, in p.u. value. PQ bus voltage magnitudes will be 
set as 0 for power flow flat start. 
Area: control area. 
gP : real power output of generators, in MVA value. 
gQ : reactive power output of PV buses, in MVA value. Some PV buses are not 
generators. 
maxQ : Maximum reactive power output of PV buses, in MVA value. 
minQ : Minimum reactive power output of PV buses, in MVA value. 
spV : Scheduled PV bus voltage magnitudes, in p.u. value. 
maxP : Maximum real power output of generators, in MVA value. 
fBus: from bus, the beginning bus of the line. 
tBus: to bus, the ending bus of the line. 
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r : line resistance, in p.u. value. 
x : line reactance, in p.u. value. 
b : line charging capacitance, in p.u. value. 
limit: transmission line limits, in MVA value. 
tap-ratio: Non-nominal transformer ratios. 1 for lines and nominal transformers. 
angle: phase-shifter angles. 
H : generator inertial constant, in value of s at its own MVA rating. 
D : damping, in value of s at its own MVA rating. 
dX : d-axis synchronous reactance, in value of p.u. at its own MVA rating. 
'
dX : d-axis transient reactance, in value of p.u. at its own MVA rating. 
qX : q-axis synchronous reactance, in value of p.u. at its own MVA rating. 
'
qX : q-axis transient reactance, in value of p.u. at its own MVA rating. 
'
0dτ : d-axis open circuit transient time constant, in value of s. 
'
0qτ : q-axis open circuit transient time constant, in value of s. 
AK : regulator gain. 
EK : exciter constant related to self-excited field. 
FK : regulator stabilizing circuit gain. 
Aτ : regulator amplifier time constant. 
Eτ : exciter time constant. 
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Fτ : regulator stabilizing circuit time constant. 
SeK : saturation parameter. 
Seτ : saturation parameter. 
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APPENDIX B 
IEEE 118-bus Test System Data 
 
Table 10 Bus Data of IEEE 118-bus System 
 
BusNo Type LP (MVA) LQ (MVA) sB (MVA) mV  Area
 
1 2 51.00 27.00 0.00 0.955 1 
2 1 20.00 9.00 0.00 0.971 1 
3 1 39.00 10.00 0.00 0.968 1 
4 2 39.00 12.00 0.00 0.998 1 
5 1 0.00 0.00 -40.0 1.002 1 
6 2 52.00 22.00 0.00 0.990 1 
7 1 19.00 2.00 0.00 0.989 1 
8 2 28.00 0.00 0.00 1.015 1 
9 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.043 1 
10 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.050 1 
11 1 70.00 23.00 0.00 0.985 1 
12 2 47.00 10.00 0.00 0.990 1 
13 1 34.00 16.00 0.00 0.968 1 
14 1 14.00 1.00 0.00 0.984 1 
15 2 90.00 30.00 0.00 0.970 1 
16 1 25.00 10.00 0.00 0.984 1 
17 1 11.00 3.00 0.00 0.995 1 
18 2 60.00 34.00 0.00 0.973 1 
19 2 45.00 25.00 0.00 0.963 1 
20 1 18.00 3.00 0.00 0.958 1 
21 1 14.00 8.00 0.00 0.959 1 
22 1 10.00 5.00 0.00 0.970 1 
23 1 7.00 3.00 0.00 1.000 1 
24 2 13.00 0.00 0.00 0.992 2 
25 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.050 1 
26 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.015 1 
27 2 71.00 13.00 0.00 0.968 1 
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28 1 17.00 7.00 0.00 0.962 1 
29 1 24.00 4.00 0.00 0.963 1 
30 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.968 1 
31 2 43.00 27.00 0.00 0.967 1 
32 2 59.00 23.00 0.00 0.964 1 
33 1 23.00 9.00 0.00 0.972 2 
34 2 59.00 26.00 14.00 0.986 2 
35 1 33.00 9.00 0.00 0.981 2 
36 2 31.00 17.00 0.00 0.980 2 
37 1 0.00 0.00 -25.0 0.992 2 
38 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.962 2 
39 1 27.00 11.00 0.00 0.970 2 
40 2 66.00 23.00 0.00 0.970 2 
41 1 37.00 10.00 0.00 0.967 2 
42 2 96.00 23.00 0.00 0.985 2 
43 1 18.00 7.00 0.00 0.978 2 
44 1 16.00 8.00 10.00 0.985 2 
45 1 53.00 22.00 10.00 0.987 2 
46 2 28.00 10.00 10.00 1.005 2 
47 1 34.00 0.00 0.00 1.017 2 
48 1 20.00 11.00 15.00 1.021 2 
49 2 87.00 30.00 0.00 1.025 2 
50 1 17.00 4.00 0.00 1.001 2 
51 1 17.00 8.00 0.00 0.967 2 
52 1 18.00 5.00 0.00 0.957 2 
53 1 23.00 11.00 0.00 0.946 2 
54 2 113.00 32.00 0.00 0.955 2 
55 2 63.00 22.00 0.00 0.952 2 
56 2 84.00 18.00 0.00 0.954 2 
57 1 12.00 3.00 0.00 0.971 2 
58 1 12.00 3.00 0.00 0.959 2 
59 2 277.00 113.00 0.00 0.985 2 
60 1 78.00 3.00 0.00 0.993 2 
61 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.995 2 
62 2 77.00 14.00 0.00 0.998 2 
63 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.969 2 
64 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.984 2 
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65 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.005 2 
66 2 39.00 18.00 0.00 1.050 2 
67 1 28.00 7.00 0.00 1.020 2 
68 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.003 2 
69 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.035 2 
70 2 66.00 20.00 0.00 0.984 2 
71 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.987 2 
72 2 12.00 0.00 0.00 0.980 2 
73 2 6.00 0.00 0.00 0.991 2 
74 2 68.00 27.00 12.00 0.958 3 
75 1 47.00 11.00 0.00 0.967  
76 2 68.00 36.00 0.00 0.943 3 
77 2 61.00 28.00 0.00 1.006 3 
78 1 71.00 26.00 0.00 1.003 3 
79 1 39.00 32.00 20.00 1.009 3 
80 2 130.00 26.00 0.00 1.040 3 
81 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.997 3 
82 1 54.00 27.00 20.00 0.989 3 
83 1 20.00 10.00 10.00 0.985 3 
84 1 11.00 7.00 0.00 0.980 3 
85 2 24.00 15.00 0.00 0.985 3 
86 1 21.00 10.00 0.00 0.987 3 
87 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.015 3 
88 1 48.00 10.00 0.00 0.987 3 
89 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.005 3 
90 2 163.00 42.00 0.00 0.985 3 
91 2 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.980 3 
92 2 65.00 10.00 0.00 0.993 3 
93 1 12.00 7.00 0.00 0.987 3 
94 1 30.00 16.00 0.00 0.991 3 
95 1 42.00 31.00 0.00 0.981 3 
96 1 38.00 15.00 0.00 0.993 3 
97 1 15.00 9.00 0.00 1.011 3 
98 1 34.00 8.00 0.00 1.024 3 
99 2 42.00 0.00 0.00 1.010 3 
100 2 37.00 18.00 0.00 1.017 3 
101 1 22.00 15.00 0.00 0.993 3 
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102 1 5.00 3.00 0.00 0.991 3 
103 2 23.00 16.00 0.00 1.001 3 
104 2 38.00 25.00 0.00 0.971 3 
105 2 31.00 26.00 20.00 0.965 3 
106 1 43.00 16.00 0.00 0.962 3 
107 2 50.00 12.00 6.00 0.952 3 
108 1 2.00 1.00 0.00 0.967 3 
109 1 8.00 3.00 0.00 0.967 3 
110 2 39.00 30.00 6.00 0.973 3 
111 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.980 3 
112 2 68.00 13.00 0.00 0.975 3 
113 2 6.00 0.00 0.00 0.993 1 
114 1 8.00 3.00 0.00 0.960 1 
115 1 22.00 7.00 0.00 0.960 1 
116 2 184.00 0.00 0.00 1.005 2 
117 1 20.00 8.00 0.00 0.974 1 
118 1 33.00 15.00 0.00 0.949 3 
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Table 11 PV Bus Data of IEEE-118 System 
 
BusNo gP (MVA) gQ (MVA) max
Q
(MVA) 
minQ  
(MVA) 
spV  (p.u.) max
P
(MVA) 
1 0.00 0.00 15.00 -5.00 0.955 100.00 
4 0.00 0.00 300.00 -300.00 0.998 100.00 
6 0.00 0.00 50.00 -13.00 0.990 100.00 
8 0.00 0.00 300.00 -300.00 1.015 100.00 
10 450.00 0.00 250.00 -147.00 1.050 650.00 
12 85.00 0.00 120.00 -35.00 0.990 185.00 
15 0.00 0.00 30.00 -10.00 0.970 100.00 
18 0.00 0.00 50.00 -16.00 0.973 100.00 
19 0.00 0.00 24.00 -8.00 0.962 100.00 
24 0.00 0.00 300.00 -300.00 0.992 100.00 
25 220.00 0.00 140.00 -47.00 1.050 320.00 
26 314.00 0.00 1000.00 -1000.00 1.015 414.00 
27 0.00 0.00 300.00 -300.00 0.968 100.00 
31 7.00 0.00 300.00 -300.00 0.967 107.00 
32 0.00 0.00 42.00 -14.00 0.963 100.00 
34 0.00 0.00 24.00 -8.00 0.984 100.00 
36 0.00 0.00 24.00 -8.00 0.980 100.00 
40 0.00 0.00 300.00 -300.00 0.970 100.00 
42 0.00 0.00 300.00 -300.00 0.985 100.00 
46 19.00 0.00 100.00 -100.00 1.005 119.00 
49 204.00 0.00 210.00 -85.00 1.025 304.00 
54 48.00 0.00 300.00 -300.00 0.955 148.00 
55 0.00 0.00 23.00 -8.00 0.952 100.00 
56 0.00 0.00 15.00 -8.00 0.954 100.00 
59 155.00 0.00 180.00 -60.00 0.985 255.00 
61 160.00 0.00 300.00 -100.00 0.995 260.00 
62 0.00 0.00 20.00 -20.00 0.998 100.00 
65 391.00 0.00 250.00 -67.00 1.005 591.00 
66 392.00 0.00 250.00 -67.00 1.050 592.00 
69 516.40 0.00 300.00 -300.00 1.035 805.20 
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70 0.00 0.00 32.00 -10.00 0.984 100.00 
72 0.00 0.00 100.00 -100.00 0.980 100.00 
73 0.00 0.00 100.00 -100.00 0.991 100.00 
74 0.00 0.00 9.00 -6.00 0.958 100.00 
76 0.00 0.00 23.00 -8.00 0.943 100.00 
61 160.00 0.00 300.00 -100.00 0.995 260.00 
77 0.00 0.00 70.00 -20.00 1.006 100.00 
80 477.00 0.00 280.00 -165.00 1.040 677.00 
85 0.00 0.00 23.00 -8.00 0.985 100.00 
87 4.00 0.00 1000.00 -100.00 1.015 104.00 
89 607.00 0.00 300.00 -210.00 1.005 807.00 
90 0.00 0.00 300.00 -300.00 0.985 100.00 
91 0.00 0.00 100.00 -100.00 0.980 100.00 
92 0.00 0.00 9.00 -3.00 0.990 100.00 
99 0.00 0.00 100.00 -100.00 1.010 100.00 
100 252.00 0.00 155.00 -50.00 1.017 352.00 
103 40.00 0.00 40.00 -15.00 1.010 140.00 
104 0.00 0.00 23.00 -8.00 0.971 100.00 
105 0.00 0.00 23.00 -8.00 0.965 100.00 
107 0.00 0.00 250.00 -250.00 0.952 100.00 
110 0.00 0.00 23.00 -8.00 0.973 100.00 
111 36.00 0.00 1000.00 -100.00 0.980 136.00 
112 0.01 0.00 1000.00 -100.00 0.975 100.00 
113 0.00 0.00 250.00 -100.00 0.993 100.00 
116 0.00 0.00 1000.00 -1000.00 1.005 100.00 
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Table 12 Line Data of IEEE-118 System 
 
LineNo fBus tBus r (p.u.) x (p.u.) b (p.u.) limit(MVA) tap-ratio
 angle 
1 1 2 0.03030 0.09990 0.02540 250 1.000 0.000 
2 1 3 0.01290 0.04240 0.01082 250 1.000 0.000 
3 4 5 0.00176 0.00798 0.00210 250 1.000 0.000 
4 3 5 0.02410 0.10800 0.02840 250 1.000 0.000 
5 5 6 0.01190 0.05400 0.01426 250 1.000 0.000 
6 6 7 0.00459 0.02080 0.00550 250 1.000 0.000 
7 8 9 0.00244 0.03050 1.16200 640 1.000 0.000 
8 8 5 0.00000 0.02670 0.00000 510 0.985 0.000 
9 9 10 0.00258 0.03220 1.23000 650 1.000 0.000 
10 4 11 0.02090 0.06880 0.01748 250 1.000 0.000 
11 5 11 0.02030 0.06820 0.01738 250 1.000 0.000 
12 11 12 0.00595 0.01960 0.00502 250 1.000 0.000 
13 2 12 0.01870 0.06160 0.01572 250 1.000 0.000 
14 3 12 0.04840 0.16000 0.04060 250 1.000 0.000 
15 7 12 0.00862 0.03400 0.00874 250 1.000 0.000 
16 11 13 0.02225 0.07310 0.01876 250 1.000 0.000 
17 12 14 0.02150 0.07070 0.01816 250 1.000 0.000 
18 13 15 0.07440 0.24440 0.06268 250 1.000 0.000 
19 14 15 0.05950 0.19500 0.05020 250 1.000 0.000 
20 12 16 0.02120 0.08340 0.02140 250 1.000 0.000 
21 15 17 0.01320 0.04370 0.04440 250 1.000 0.000 
22 16 17 0.04540 0.18010 0.04660 250 1.000 0.000 
23 17 18 0.01230 0.05050 0.01298 250 1.000 0.000 
24 18 19 0.01119 0.04930 0.01142 250 1.000 0.000 
25 19 20 0.02520 0.11700 0.02980 250 1.000 0.000 
26 15 19 0.01200 0.03940 0.01010 250 1.000 0.000 
27 20 21 0.01830 0.08490 0.02160 250 1.000 0.000 
28 21 22 0.02090 0.09700 0.02460 250 1.000 0.000 
29 22 23 0.03420 0.15900 0.04040 250 1.000 0.000 
30 23 24 0.01350 0.04920 0.04980 250 1.000 0.000 
31 23 25 0.01560 0.08000 0.08640 380 1.000 0.000 
32 26 25 0.00000 0.03820 0.00000 380 0.960 0.000 
33 25 27 0.03180 0.16300 0.17640 280 1.000 0.000 
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34 27 28 0.01913 0.08550 0.02160 250 1.000 0.000 
35 28 29 0.02370 0.09430 0.02380 250 1.000 0.000 
36 30 17 0.00000 0.03880 0.00000 520 0.960 0.000 
37 8 30 0.00431 0.05040 0.51400 500 1.000 0.000 
38 26 30 0.00799 0.08600 0.90800 380 1.000 0.000 
39 17 31 0.04740 0.15630 0.03990 250 1.000 0.000 
40 29 31 0.01080 0.03310 0.00830 250 1.000 0.000 
41 23 32 0.03170 0.11530 0.11730 250 1.000 0.000 
42 31 32 0.02980 0.09850 0.02510 250 1.000 0.000 
43 27 32 0.02290 0.07550 0.01926 250 1.000 0.000 
44 15 33 0.03800 0.12440 0.03194 250 1.000 0.000 
45 19 34 0.07520 0.24700 0.06320 250 1.000 0.000 
46 35 36 0.00224 0.01020 0.00268 250 1.000 0.000 
47 35 37 0.01100 0.04970 0.01318 250 1.000 0.000 
48 33 37 0.04150 0.14200 0.03660 250 1.000 0.000 
49 34 36 0.00871 0.02680 0.00568 250 1.000 0.000 
50 34 37 0.00256 0.00940 0.00984 250 1.000 0.000 
51 38 37 0.00000 0.03750 0.00000 350 0.935 0.000 
52 37 39 0.03210 0.10600 0.02700 250 1.000 0.000 
53 37 40 0.05930 0.16800 0.04200 250 1.000 0.000 
54 30 38 0.00464 0.05400 0.42200 250 1.000 0.000 
55 39 40 0.01840 0.06050 0.01552 250 1.000 0.000 
56 40 41 0.01450 0.04870 0.01222 250 1.000 0.000 
57 40 42 0.05550 0.18300 0.04660 250 1.000 0.000 
58 41 42 0.04100 0.13500 0.03440 250 1.000 0.000 
59 43 44 0.06080 0.24540 0.06068 250 1.000 0.000 
60 34 43 0.04130 0.16810 0.04226 250 1.000 0.000 
61 44 45 0.02240 0.09010 0.02240 250 1.000 0.000 
62 45 46 0.04000 0.13560 0.03320 250 1.000 0.000 
63 46 47 0.03800 0.12700 0.03160 250 1.000 0.000 
64 46 48 0.06010 0.18900 0.04720 250 1.000 0.000 
65 47 49 0.01910 0.06250 0.01604 250 1.000 0.000 
66 42 49 0.07150 0.32300 0.08600 250 1.000 0.000 
67 42 49 0.07150 0.32300 0.08600 250 1.000 0.000 
68 45 49 0.06840 0.18600 0.04440 250 1.000 0.000 
69 48 49 0.01790 0.05050 0.01258 250 1.000 0.000 
70 49 50 0.02670 0.07520 0.01874 250 1.000 0.000 
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71 49 51 0.04860 0.13700 0.03420 250 1.000 0.000 
72 51 52 0.02030 0.05880 0.01396 250 1.000 0.000 
73 52 53 0.04050 0.16350 0.04058 250 1.000 0.000 
74 53 54 0.02630 0.12200 0.03100 250 1.000 0.000 
75 49 54 0.07300 0.28900 0.07380 250 1.000 0.000 
76 49 54 0.07300 0.28900 0.07380 250 1.000 0.000 
77 54 55 0.01690 0.07070 0.02020 250 1.000 0.000 
78 54 56 0.00275 0.00955 0.00732 250 1.000 0.000 
79 55 56 0.00488 0.01510 0.00374 250 1.000 0.000 
80 56 57 0.03430 0.09660 0.02420 250 1.000 0.000 
81 50 57 0.04740 0.13400 0.03320 250 1.000 0.000 
82 56 58 0.03430 0.09660 0.02420 250 1.000 0.000 
83 51 58 0.02550 0.07190 0.01788 250 1.000 0.000 
84 54 59 0.05030 0.22930 0.05980 250 1.000 0.000 
85 56 59 0.08250 0.25100 0.05690 250 1.000 0.000 
86 56 59 0.08250 0.25100 0.05690 250 1.000 0.000 
87 55 59 0.04739 0.21580 0.05646 250 1.000 0.000 
88 59 60 0.03170 0.14500 0.03760 250 1.000 0.000 
89 59 61 0.03280 0.15000 0.03880 250 1.000 0.000 
90 60 61 0.00264 0.01350 0.01456 250 1.000 0.000 
91 60 62 0.01230 0.05610 0.01468 250 1.000 0.000 
92 61 62 0.00824 0.03760 0.00980 250 1.000 0.000 
93 63 59 0.00000 0.03860 0.00000 250 0.960 0.000 
94 63 64 0.00172 0.02000 0.21600 250 1.000 0.000 
95 64 61 0.00000 0.02680 0.00000 250 0.985 0.000 
96 38 65 0.00901 0.09860 1.04600 250 1.000 0.000 
97 64 65 0.00269 0.03020 0.38000 250 1.000 0.000 
98 49 66 0.01800 0.09190 0.02480 250 1.000 0.000 
99 49 66 0.01800 0.09190 0.02480 250 1.000 0.000 
100 62 66 0.04820 0.21800 0.05780 250 1.000 0.000 
101 62 67 0.02580 0.11700 0.03100 250 1.000 0.000 
102 65 66 0.00000 0.03700 0.00000 250 0.935 0.000 
103 66 67 0.02240 0.10150 0.02682 250 1.000 0.000 
104 65 68 0.00138 0.01600 0.63800 480 1.000 0.000 
105 47 69 0.08440 0.27780 0.07092 250 1.000 0.000 
106 49 69 0.09850 0.32400 0.08280 250 1.000 0.000 
107 68 69 0.00000 0.03700 0.00000 500 0.935 0.000 
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108 69 70 0.03000 0.12700 0.12200 300 1.000 0.000 
109 24 70 0.00221 0.41150 0.10198 250 1.000 0.000 
110 70 71 0.00882 0.03550 0.00878 250 1.000 0.000 
111 24 72 0.04880 0.19600 0.04880 250 1.000 0.000 
112 71 72 0.04460 0.18000 0.04444 250 1.000 0.000 
113 71 73 0.00866 0.04540 0.01178 250 1.000 0.000 
114 70 74 0.04010 0.13230 0.03368 250 1.000 0.000 
115 70 75 0.04280 0.14100 0.03600 250 1.000 0.000 
116 69 75 0.04050 0.12200 0.12400 280 1.000 0.000 
117 74 75 0.01230 0.04060 0.01034 250 1.000 0.000 
118 76 77 0.04440 0.14800 0.03680 250 1.000 0.000 
119 69 77 0.03090 0.10100 0.10380 580 1.000 0.000 
120 75 77 0.06010 0.19990 0.04978 250 1.000 0.000 
121 77 78 0.00376 0.01240 0.01264 250 1.000 0.000 
122 78 79 0.00546 0.02440 0.00648 250 1.000 0.000 
123 77 80 0.01700 0.04850 0.04720 250 1.000 0.000 
124 77 80 0.02940 0.10500 0.02280 250 1.000 0.000 
125 79 80 0.01560 0.07040 0.01870 250 1.000 0.000 
126 68 81 0.00175 0.02020 0.80800 560 1.000 0.000 
127 81 80 0.00000 0.03700 0.00000 560 0.935 0.000 
128 77 82 0.02980 0.08530 0.08174 250 1.000 0.000 
129 82 83 0.01120 0.03665 0.03796 250 1.000 0.000 
130 83 84 0.06250 0.13200 0.02580 250 1.000 0.000 
131 83 85 0.04300 0.14800 0.03480 250 1.000 0.000 
132 84 85 0.03020 0.06410 0.01234 250 1.000 0.000 
133 85 86 0.03500 0.12300 0.02760 250 1.000 0.000 
134 86 87 0.02828 0.20740 0.04450 250 1.000 0.000 
135 85 88 0.02000 0.10200 0.02760 250 1.000 0.000 
136 85 89 0.02390 0.17300 0.04700 250 1.000 0.000 
137 88 89 0.01390 0.07120 0.01934 250 1.000 0.000 
138 89 90 0.05180 0.18800 0.05280 250 1.000 0.000 
139 89 90 0.02380 0.09970 0.10600 250 1.000 0.000 
140 90 91 0.02540 0.08360 0.02140 250 1.000 0.000 
141 89 92 0.00990 0.05050 0.05480 250 1.000 0.000 
142 89 92 0.03930 0.15810 0.04140 250 1.000 0.000 
143 91 92 0.03870 0.12720 0.03268 250 1.000 0.000 
144 92 93 0.02580 0.08480 0.02180 250 1.000 0.000 
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145 92 94 0.04810 0.15800 0.04060 250 1.000 0.000 
146 93 94 0.02230 0.07320 0.01876 250 1.000 0.000 
147 94 95 0.01320 0.04340 0.01110 250 1.000 0.000 
148 80 96 0.03560 0.18200 0.04940 250 1.000 0.000 
149 82 96 0.01620 0.05300 0.05440 250 1.000 0.000 
150 94 96 0.02690 0.08690 0.02300 250 1.000 0.000 
151 80 97 0.01830 0.09340 0.02540 250 1.000 0.000 
152 80 98 0.02380 0.10800 0.02860 250 1.000 0.000 
153 80 99 0.04540 0.20600 0.05460 250 1.000 0.000 
154 92 100 0.06480 0.29500 0.04720 250 1.000 0.000 
155 94 100 0.01780 0.05800 0.06040 250 1.000 0.000 
156 95 96 0.01710 0.05470 0.01474 250 1.000 0.000 
157 96 97 0.01730 0.08850 0.02400 250 1.000 0.000 
158 98 100 0.03970 0.17900 0.04760 250 1.000 0.000 
159 99 100 0.01800 0.08130 0.02160 250 1.000 0.000 
160 100 101 0.02770 0.12620 0.03280 250 1.000 0.000 
161 92 102 0.01230 0.05590 0.01464 250 1.000 0.000 
162 101 102 0.02460 0.11200 0.02940 250 1.000 0.000 
163 100 103 0.01600 0.05250 0.05360 250 1.000 0.000 
164 100 104 0.04510 0.20400 0.05410 250 1.000 0.000 
165 103 104 0.04660 0.15840 0.04070 250 1.000 0.000 
166 103 105 0.05350 0.16250 0.04080 250 1.000 0.000 
167 100 106 0.06050 0.22900 0.06200 250 1.000 0.000 
168 104 105 0.00994 0.03780 0.00986 250 1.000 0.000 
169 105 106 0.01400 0.05470 0.01434 250 1.000 0.000 
170 105 107 0.05300 0.18300 0.04720 250 1.000 0.000 
171 105 108 0.02610 0.07030 0.01844 250 1.000 0.000 
172 106 107 0.05300 0.18300 0.04720 250 1.000 0.000 
173 108 109 0.01050 0.02880 0.00760 250 1.000 0.000 
174 103 110 0.03906 0.18130 0.04610 250 1.000 0.000 
175 109 110 0.02780 0.07620 0.02020 250 1.000 0.000 
176 110 111 0.02200 0.07550 0.02000 250 1.000 0.000 
177 110 112 0.02470 0.06400 0.06200 250 1.000 0.000 
178 17 113 0.00913 0.03010 0.00768 250 1.000 0.000 
179 32 113 0.06150 0.20300 0.05180 250 1.000 0.000 
180 32 114 0.01350 0.06120 0.01628 250 1.000 0.000 
181 27 115 0.01640 0.07410 0.01972 250 1.000 0.000 
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182 114 115 0.00230 0.01040 0.00276 250 1.000 0.000 
183 68 116 0.00034 0.00405 0.16400 300 1.000 0.000 
184 12 117 0.03290 0.14000 0.03580 250 1.000 0.000 
185 75 118 0.01450 0.04810 0.01198 250 1.000 0.000 
186 76 118 0.01640 0.05440 0.01356 250 1.000 0.000 
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Table 13 Generator Data of IEEE-118 System 
 
GenNo BusNo MVA H (s) D
(s) 
dX
(p.u.) 
'
dX
(p.u.) 
qX
(p.u.) 
'
qX
(p.u.) 
'
0dτ  
(p.u.) 
'
0qτ  
(p.u.) 
1 10 800 8.00 0.00 0.0875 0.0875 0.0875 0.0875 7.40 0.000 
2 12 800 22.00 0.00 0.0636 0.0636 0.0636 0.0636 6.10 0.300 
3 25 800 8.00 0.00 0.1750 0.1750 0.1750 0.1750 6.10 0.300 
4 26 800 14.00 0.00 0.1000 0.1000 0.1000 0.1000 4.75 1.500 
5 31 800 26.00 0.00 0.0538 0.0538 0.0538 0.0538 4.75 1.500 
6 46 800 8.00 0.00 0.0875 0.0875 0.0875 0.0875 7.40 0.000 
7 49 800 8.00 0.00 0.0875 0.0875 0.0875 0.0875 6.10 0.300 
8 54 800 8.00 0.00 0.0875 0.0875 0.0875 0.0875 6.10 0.300 
9 59 800 8.00 0.00 0.0875 0.0875 0.0875 0.0875 4.75 1.500 
10 61 800 12.00 0.00 0.1167 0.1167 0.1167 0.1167 4.75 1.500 
11 65 800 10.00 0.00 0.1400 0.1400 0.1400 0.1400 7.40 0.000 
12 66 800 12.00 0.00 0.1167 0.1167 0.1167 0.1167 6.10 0.300 
13 69 800 20.00 0.00 0.0700 0.0700 0.0700 0.0700 6.10 0.300 
14 80 800 20.00 0.00 0.0700 0.0700 0.0700 0.0700 4.75 1.500 
15 87 800 30.00 0.00 0.0467 0.0467 0.0467 0.0467 4.75 1.500 
16 89 800 38.148 0.00 0.0500 0.0500 0.0500 0.0500 7.40 0.000 
17 100 800 32.00 0.00 0.0438 0.0438 0.0438 0.0438 6.10 0.300 
18 103 800 8.00 0.00 0.0875 0.0875 0.0875 0.0875 6.10 0.300 
19 111 800 16.00 0.00 0.0875 0.0875 0.0875 0.0875 4.75 1.500 
20 112 800 15.00 0.00 0.0467 0.0467 0.0467 0.0467 4.75 1.500 
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Table 14 Exciter Data of IEEE-118 System 
 
GenNo BusNo AK  EK  FK  Aτ (s) Eτ (s) Fτ (s) SeK (s) Seτ (s) 
1 10 20 1.00 0.0012 0.2500 0.000 1.00 0.0039 1.5550 
2 12 20 1.00 0.0010 0.2500 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.5550 
3 25 20 1.00 0.0010 0.2500 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.5550 
4 26 20 1.00 0.0010 0.2500 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.5550 
5 31 20 1.00 0.0010 0.2500 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.5550 
6 46 20 1.00 0.0012 0.2500 0.000 1.00 0.0039 1.5550 
7 49 20 1.00 0.0010 0.2500 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.5550 
8 54 20 1.00 0.0010 0.2500 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.5550 
9 59 20 1.00 0.0010 0.2500 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.5550 
10 61 20 1.00 0.0010 0.2500 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.5550 
11 65 20 1.00 0.0012 0.2500 0.000 1.00 0.0039 1.5550 
12 66 20 1.00 0.0010 0.2500 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.5550 
13 69 20 1.00 0.0010 0.2500 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.5550 
14 80 20 1.00 0.0010 0.2500 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.5550 
15 87 20 1.00 0.0010 0.2500 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.5550 
16 89 20 1.00 0.0012 0.2500 0.000 1.00 0.0039 1.5550 
17 100 20 1.00 0.0010 0.2500 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.5550 
18 103 20 1.00 0.0010 0.2500 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.5550 
19 111 20 1.00 0.0010 0.2500 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.5550 
20 112 20 1.00 0.0010 0.2500 0.314 1.00 0.0039 1.5550 
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APPENDIX C 
IEEE 39-bus New England Test System Data 
 
Table 15 Bus Data of IEEE 39-bus New England System 
 
BusNo Type LP (MVA) L
Q
(MVA) 
sB (MVA) mV  Area
 
1 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.047 1 
2 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.049 1 
3 1 322.00 2.40 0.00 1.030 1 
4 1 500.00 184.00 0.00 1.003 1 
5 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.005 1 
6 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.007 1 
7 1 233.80 84.00 0.00 0.996 1 
8 1 522.00 176.00 0.00 0.995 1 
9 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.028 1 
10 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.017 1 
11 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.012 1 
12 1 8.50 88.00 0.00 1.000 1 
13 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.014 1 
14 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.011 1 
15 1 320.00 153.00 0.00 1.015 1 
16 1 329.00 32.30 0.00 1.032 1 
17 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.034 1 
18 1 158.00 30.00 0.00 1.031 1 
19 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.050 1 
20 1 680.00 103.00 0.00 0.991 1 
21 1 274.00 115.00 0.00 1.032 1 
22 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.050 1 
23 1 247.50 84.60 0.00 1.045 1 
24 1 308.60 -92.20 0.00 1.037 1 
25 1 224.00 47.20 0.00 1.057 1 
26 1 139.00 17.00 0.00 1.052 1 
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27 1 281.00 75.50 0.00 1.037 1 
28 1 206.00 27.60 0.00 1.050 1 
29 1 283.50 26.90 0.00 1.050 1 
30 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.047 1 
31 3 9.20 4.60 0.00 0.982 1 
32 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.983 1 
33 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.997 1 
34 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.012 1 
35 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.049 1 
36 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.063 1 
37 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.028 1 
38 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.026 1 
39 2 1104.00 250.00 0.00 1.030 1 
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Table 16 PV Bus Data of IEEE 39-bus New England System 
 
BusNo gP (MVA) g
Q
(MVA) 
maxQ
(MVA) 
minQ  
(MVA) 
spV  (p.u.) max
P
(MVA) 
30 250.00 144.92 99990 -99990 1.0475 350.00 
31 572.83 207.04 99990 -99990 0.9820 1145.00 
32 650.00 205.73 99990 -99990 0.9831 750.00 
33 632.00 108.94 99990 -99990 0.9972 732.00 
34 508.00 166.99 99990 -99990 1.0123 608.00 
35 650.00 211.11 99990 -99990 1.0493 750.00 
36 560.00 100.44 99990 -99990 1.0635 660.00 
37 540.00 0.65 99990 -99990 1.0278 640.00 
38 830.00 22.66 99990 -99990 1.0265 930.00 
39 1000.00 87.88 99990 -99990 1.0300 1100.00 
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Table 17 Line Data of IEEE 39-bus New England System 
 
LineNo fBus tBus r (p.u.) x (p.u.) b (p.u.) limit(MVA) tap-ratio
 angle 
1 2 1 0.00350 0.04110 0.69870 1000 0.930 0.000 
2 39 1 0.00100 0.02500 0.75000 1000 0.970 0.000 
3 3 2 0.00130 0.01510 0.25720 1000 0.960 0.000 
4 25 2 0.00700 0.00860 0.14600 1000 1.000 0.000 
5 4 3 0.00130 0.02130 0.22140 1000 1.000 0.000 
6 18 3 0.00110 0.01330 0.21380 1000 1.000 0.000 
7 5 4 0.00080 0.01280 0.13420 1000 1.000 0.000 
8 14 4 0.00080 0.01290 0.13820 1000 1.000 0.000 
9 6 5 0.00020 0.00260 0.04340 1000 1.000 0.000 
10 4 5 0.01335 0.04211 0.01280 1000 1.000 0.000 
11 7 8 0.00000 0.17615 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
12 7 9 0.00000 0.11001 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
13 9 10 0.03181 0.08450 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
14 6 11 0.09498 0.19890 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
15 6 12 0.12291 0.25581 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
16 6 13 0.06615 0.13027 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
17 9 14 0.12711 0.27038 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
18 10 11 0.08205 0.19207 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
19 12 13 0.22092 0.19988 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
20 13 14 0.17093 0.34802 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
21 7 8 0.00000 0.17615 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
22 7 9 0.00000 0.11001 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
23 9 10 0.03181 0.08450 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
24 6 11 0.09498 0.19890 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
25 6 12 0.12291 0.25581 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
26 6 13 0.06615 0.13027 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
27 9 14 0.12711 0.27038 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
28 10 11 0.08205 0.19207 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
29 12 13 0.22092 0.19988 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
30 13 14 0.17093 0.34802 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
31 7 8 0.00000 0.17615 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
32 7 9 0.00000 0.11001 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
33 9 10 0.03181 0.08450 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
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34 6 11 0.09498 0.19890 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
35 6 12 0.12291 0.25581 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
36 6 13 0.06615 0.13027 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
37 9 14 0.12711 0.27038 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
38 10 11 0.08205 0.19207 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
39 12 13 0.22092 0.19988 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
40 13 14 0.17093 0.34802 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
41 7 8 0.00000 0.17615 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
42 7 9 0.00000 0.11001 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
43 9 10 0.03181 0.08450 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
44 6 11 0.09498 0.19890 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
45 6 12 0.12291 0.25581 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
46 6 13 0.06615 0.13027 0.00000 1000 1.000 0.000 
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Table 18 Generator Data of IEEE 39-bus New England System 
 
GenNo BusNo MVA H  
(s) 
D  
(s) 
dX
(p.u.) 
'
dX
(p.u.) 
qX
(p.u.) 
'
qX
(p.u.) 
'
0dτ  
(p.u.) 
'
0qτ  
(p.u.) 
1 30 1000 3.50 0.00 0.310 0.310 0.310 0.310 8.96 0.310 
2 31 1000 2.53 0.00 0.697 0.697 0.697 0.697 6.00 0.535 
3 32 1000 2.98 0.00 0.531 0.531 0.531 0.531 5.89 0.600 
4 33 1000 2.38 0.00 0.436 0.436 0.436 0.436 6.00 0.535 
5 34 1000 2.17 0.00 1.320 1.320 1.320 1.320 6.00 0.535 
6 35 1000 2.90 0.00 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 6.00 0.535 
7 36 1000 2.20 0.00 0.490 0.490 0.490 0.490 6.00 0.535 
8 37 1000 2.03 0.00 0.570 0.570 0.570 0.570 6.00 0.535 
9 38 1000 2.88 0.00 0.570 0.570 0.570 0.570 6.00 0.535 
10 39 1000 41.67 0.00 0.060 0.060 0.06 0.060 6.00 0.535 
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Table 19 Exciter Data of IEEE 39-bus New England System 
 
GenNo BusNo AK  EK  FK  Aτ (s) Eτ (s) Fτ (s) SeK (s) Seτ (s) 
1 30 20 1.00 0.0630 0.2500 0.3140 0.3500 0.0039 1.5550 
2 31 20 1.00 0.0630 0.2500 0.3140 0.3500 0.0039 1.5550 
3 32 20 1.00 0.0630 0.2500 0.3140 0.3500 0.0039 1.5550 
4 33 20 1.00 0.0630 0.2500 0.3140 0.3500 0.0039 1.5550 
5 34 20 1.00 0.0630 0.2500 0.3140 0.3500 0.0039 1.5550 
6 35 20 1.00 0.0630 0.2500 0.3140 0.3500 0.0039 1.5550 
7 36 20 1.00 0.0630 0.2500 0.3140 0.3500 0.0039 1.5550 
8 37 20 1.00 0.0630 0.2500 0.3140 0.3500 0.0039 1.5550 
9 38 20 1.00 0.0630 0.2500 0.3140 0.3500 0.0039 1.5550 
10 39 20 1.00 0.0630 0.2500 0.3140 0.3500 0.0039 1.5550 
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